Optimal Bailouts and the Doom Loop with a Financial Network*

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Abstract

Banks usually hold large amounts of domestic debt which makes them vulnerable to their own sovereign’s default risk. At the same time, governments often resort to costly bailouts when their banking sector is in trouble. We investigate how the network structure and the distribution of ownership of sovereign debt within the banking sector jointly affect the optimal bailout policy under this “doom loop”. We argue that rescuing banks with high domestic sovereign exposure is optimal if these banks are sufficiently central, even though that requires larger bailout expenditures than rescuing otherwise identical low-exposure banks. Our model illustrates how the “doom loop” exacerbates the “too interconnected to fail” problem.

Keywords: Financial networks, home bias, sovereign debt, bailouts, doom loop

JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28, H63, H81

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1 Introduction

Throughout modern economic history, almost every major crisis has added its own signature terms to the dictionary of economic thought. For the European debt crisis that followed the Great Recession in 2008/09, one of the front-running candidates is certainly the so-called bank-sovereign “doom loop” - a term that has made its way into the vocabulary of policymakers, journalists, and researchers alike. The nexus between sovereigns and banks was identified as a major culprit responsible for the amplification of adverse shocks during the crisis.

The doom loop can be described as follows: Banks usually hold large amounts of domestic public debt which makes them vulnerable to sovereign default risk. For instance, as of March 2021 some euro area banking sectors held well beyond 15% of their government’s total stock of outstanding debt securities. At the same time, governments often resort to costly public bailouts when their domestic banking sector is at risk. If these bailouts are debt-financed and lead to an increase in risk premia on sovereign debt (i.e., a decrease in bond prices), bank assets drop in value and the size of the bailouts required to keep the banks solvent increases further. If a significant fraction of banks’ assets consists of domestic sovereign debt, this adverse feedback loop can leave both the government’s and banks’ balance sheets severely impaired.¹ Historical examples for the devastating force of the “doom loop” include Greece, where turmoil in sovereign debt markets damaged Greek banks’ balance sheets and made large bailouts necessary that further weakened Greece’s fiscal posi-

¹Note for example that Italian banks currently hold around 10% of their assets in domestic sovereign debt (Figure 1).
tion; and Ireland, where the loop originated in the banking sector and thus worked in the opposite direction.

Even though it was the European sovereign debt crisis that provided the blueprint for a crisis of the “doom loop” type, there is renewed public and academic interest in the topic in the face of the recent Covid-19 pandemic. Hard-hit countries such as Italy (where the public debt-to-GDP ratio was already relatively high prior to the pandemic) provide the most fertile ground for a revival of the doom loop. On the one hand, strict shutdown measures during the pandemic led to high amounts of non-performing loans that weighed on banks’ balance sheets. On the other hand, unprecedented fiscal spending efforts exerted upward pressure on the level of sovereign debt and, most likely, interest rate spreads. It is therefore not surprising that the topic of bank bailouts has returned to the agenda of policymakers in Italy and elsewhere.

In this paper, we investigate how the distribution of sovereign debt across banks and the structure of the interbank network jointly affect the government’s optimal bailout decision in the presence of the doom loop. In doing so, we combine two strands of literature that have so far evolved separately, namely the doom loop literature (e.g. Acharya et al. (2014), Cooper and Nikolov (2018), Farhi and Tirole (2018)) and the literature about contagion in financial networks (Acemoglu et al. (2015), Elliott et al. (2014), Cabrales et al. (2017)). More precisely, we consider an exogenous network of (unsecured) interbank liabilities after an adverse shock has rendered a set of banks insolvent. Each bank holds an exogenous amount of its own government’s bonds. Without any government intervention, there may be a default cascade that causes large welfare losses due to bankruptcy deadweight costs. The government can, however, reduce these losses by bailing out some or all of the failing banks. To do so, the government must borrow the required funds in the sovereign debt market which pushes down bond prices and thus puts further pressure on banks’ balance sheets. A rational government internalizes this “second-round” effect, so bailouts are, by definition, large enough to cover the total shortfall of the banks to be rescued. The government trades off the welfare losses of a default cascade against those associated with a higher sovereign default probability, as bank liabilities effectively move onto the government’s balance sheet.

Our model is related to existing models of intervention in networks, but there is a fundamental difference: Without the doom loop, bailouts of different banks would be complementary in the sense that bailing out one bank weakly decreases the pecuniary cost of bailing out other banks (because their shortfall weakly decreases). In our model, however,

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2 For example, on 28 April 2020 the rating agency Fitch lowered Italy’s sovereign rating on the grounds of the expected repercussions from the Covid-19 pandemic; just two weeks later, on 12 May 2020, a downgrade of four of the biggest Italian banks (UniCredit, Intesa Sanpaolo, Mediobanca, UBI) followed suit. However, thanks in part to the ECB’s accommodative monetary policy, Italian sovereign spreads have not persistently increased.
this relationship can break down if other banks possess large holdings of sovereign debt. In such a case, bailing out one bank might make bailouts of other banks even more expensive. In other words, there can be both “crowding out” and “crowding in” of further bailouts.

Existing literature distinguishes two types of financial contagion, namely direct contagion due to counterparty default (see Glasserman and Young (2016) for a survey) and indirect contagion through common asset exposure (Adrian and Shin (2010); Greenwood et al. (2015)). Our paper features both types of contagion and emphasizes a link between both through the government’s bailout decision. For example, a bailout may prevent direct contagion emanating from the targeted bank(s), but cause indirect contagion of banks that are critically exposed to the sovereign. However, our paper abstracts from more general macroeconomic effects (such as an increase in unemployment, a reduction in output, or a contraction of government revenues) that might emanate from any bailout policy. These effects, which can be thought of as macroeconomic externalities, were, of course, central to some of the earlier doom loop literature (see, e.g., Brunnermeier et al. (2016)).

Our first set of results applies to the special case of complete bailouts where the government can only bail out all banks or none. We show (not surprisingly) that the doom loop makes complete bailouts socially more costly if a larger amount of sovereign debt is held by domestic banks. Moreover, for a given aggregate amount of sovereign debt held by the banking sector, it is socially preferable that it be held by relatively well-capitalized banks. The intuition for these results is straightforward: Financing a bailout imposes a cost on banks that are exposed to sovereign default risk. The larger those banks’ loss-absorbing equity buffer, the lower welfare losses will be. If, in contrast, public debt is largely held by weakly capitalized banks, the doom loop hits them with a stronger force and the required bailout may become very large.

Our second set of results generalizes the bailout decision by allowing the government to bail out any subset of banks (partial bailouts). The government chooses the set of surviving banks to maximize social welfare, taking into account impacts of the bailout of any bank on other banks and on sovereign risk. Our analysis shows that whether or not a given bank will be bailed out jointly depends on its position in the network and its sovereign debt exposure. We identify a measure of centrality (“node depth” as in Glasserman and Young (2015)) that captures a bank’s contagion potential depending on its position in the network. Among two otherwise identical banks, the government prefers to bail out the one with higher node depth; this would be true even without of the doom loop. With the doom loop active, however, the presence of sovereign debt on banks’ balance sheets - even if it is completely equally distributed - further strengthens the importance of centrality as a determinant of the government’s decision of which bank(s) to bail out.
We also find that, in general, higher domestic sovereign exposure decreases banks’ chances of being bailed out because of a “doom loop multiplier” effect: Every dollar raised for the bailout of a given bank lowers the value of sovereign debt on its balance sheet and thus increases the required bailout expenditure. However, for systemically important banks there can be a countervailing force: Letting a systemically important bank fail while others are bailed out can lead to large additional deadweight losses among its creditors due to the associated drop in the value of its sovereign debt holdings. This finding implies that given a network of interbank liabilities, banks can use their sovereign debt position as a strategic tool to increase the odds of being bailed out. Our model thus provides a novel, network-based explanation for the increase in “home bias” in banks’ sovereign portfolios during the European sovereign debt crisis.

2 Related Literature

Our work is related to the seminal articles by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Allen and Gale (2000) in regards to the financial stability implications of different network structures. These studies use stylized networks to show how contagion propagates when individual financial institutions are hit by idiosyncratic negative liquidity shocks. Subsequent developments include Eisenberg and Noe (2001) who show existence and uniqueness of payment vectors that simultaneously clear liabilities in a general class of networks; Glasserman and Young (2015) who assess the extent of contagion accounting for bankruptcy costs; Acemoglu et al. (2015) who focus on the systemic risk implications of different network topologies; and Elliott et al. (2014) and Cabrales et al. (2017) who model network linkages as equity cross-holdings or direct claims on other banks’ projects. We refer to Cabrales et al. (2016) and Glasserman and Young (2016) for excellent surveys on contagion in financial networks.

Closely related to our paper is the small, yet growing, literature that analyzes government interventions in interbank networks. For example, Bernard et al. (2018) study under which conditions the government can credibly commit to organize an incentive-compatible bail-in in which solvent banks contribute to rescuing the defaulting banks. Altinoglu and Stiglitz (2019) show how systemically important institutions can emerge as a result of banks expecting a public bailout. Erol (2019) shows that the expectation of bailouts leads to higher connectivity and a core-periphery network structure. In these papers, the government’s willingness to bail out the banks ex post makes the whole banking system more fragile ex ante. In contrast to our model, however, Erol (2019) does not model the government’s bailout decision explicitly.

Our paper leverages insights from two strands of literature: the financial contagion literature and the large “doom loop” literature that has emerged in recent years in response
to the European sovereign debt crisis. Brunnermeier et al. (2016) conceptually distinguish two types of loops. The first is the “real economy loop” where sovereign stress reduces the value of public debt on banks’ balance sheets and thereby induces a credit crunch; through reduced economic activity and lower tax revenues, this credit crunch then feeds back into the fiscal position. The second is the “bailout loop” that constitutes the focus of this paper.

Acharya et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence for both “directions” of the loop. They show that (a) bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk in 2008 and (b) changes in sovereign CDS rates in turn explain changes in bank CDS rates. The perceived stabilization of the banking sector through a bailout can thus turn out to be a “Pyrrhic victory”. In more recent work, Hur et al. (2021) confirm the finding that the “diabolic loop” caused by bank bailouts can be too costly to justify them.

Acharya et al. (2014) and Farhi and Tirole (2018) develop theoretical models of the “deadly embrace” that are related to ours, but do not consider interbank linkages and therefore the implications of network structure. Cooper and Nikolov (2018) study the strategic interaction between banks and the government. They show that if the government cannot commit to a credible no-bailout policy, banks in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium anticipate a bailout and choose insufficient equity buffers. While in our model banks are inactive agents with exogenous balance sheets, our analysis of partial bailouts suggests that in a dynamic setting banks could influence the odds of being bailed out through their sovereign debt exposure.

Finally, our paper indirectly relates to a strand of literature that empirically tests different hypotheses of why euro area banks exhibited increasing sovereign debt “home bias” during and after the crisis. Altavilla et al. (2017) and Crosignani (2021) all find that the observed increase in domestic sovereign debt holdings during the crisis was stronger for poorly capitalized banks. This finding is worrisome if viewed in the context of our results on complete bailouts. As we show in the paper, bailouts are socially more costly if domestic sovereign debt is largely held by fragile banks.

3 Model

Our model has three periods \( t = 0, 1, 2 \) and features a set of banks \( N = \{1, \ldots, n\} \) and a benevolent government that minimizes welfare losses after an exogenous shock has rendered a subset of banks insolvent. In the initial period \( t = 0 \), an exogenous negative shock hits a subset of the banks and lowers the value of their assets below that of their liabilities.

\footnote{Indeed, Altavilla et al. (2017) and Popov and Van Horen (2015) find that during the European sovereign debt crisis banks with higher exposure to stressed sovereigns cut their lending to the domestic real economy significantly more than banks with low exposure.}

\footnote{In that sense our model is closer to an Ireland-type doom loop than to the Greece-type, but we could just as well model the latter by initially shocking the government’s fiscal position instead.}
Without a public bailout in $t = 1$ a cascade of bank defaults with associated bankruptcy deadweight costs may unfold. However, the government can decide to issue new debt in $t = 1$ and transfer funds to the insolvent banks to prevent the default cascade. In period $t = 2$ all sovereign debt matures and the government can either repay or not. We describe all relevant model components and the government’s tradeoff in the following paragraphs.

### 3.1 Banks

The banks are connected through an exogenous network of unsecured interbank liabilities described by the matrix $L = (L_{ij})$ for $i, j \in N$, where $L_{ij} \geq 0$ represents the gross value of bank $j$’s liability to bank $i$ and $L_{ii} = 0 \forall i \in N$. We denote the total interbank liabilities of bank $j$ by $L_j = \sum_{i=1}^{n} L_{ij}$ and use $L$ to denote the corresponding $n \times 1$ vector. Moreover, it will be useful to define the relative liability matrix $\Pi$ with entries $\pi_{ij} = L_{ij} / L_j$ if $L_j \neq 0$ and $\pi_{ij} = 0$ otherwise. In words, $\pi_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ is the share of bank $j$’s interbank liabilities that it owes to bank $i$. Hence, the $n \times 1$ vector $(\Pi L)$ contains the book values of each bank’s interbank assets. For instance, $\left(\Pi L\right)_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \pi_{ij} L_j$ is the book value of bank $i$’s interbank assets.

In addition to interbank assets and liabilities, bank $i$’s balance sheet contains (a) outside assets $c^i \geq 0$ (including cash and loans to the non-financial sector), (b) senior liabilities $d^i > 0$ (e.g. deposits), and (c) exogenous domestic sovereign bond holdings $b^i \geq 0$ evaluated at the endogenous price $q_0$. The value of equity at $t = 0$, defined as assets minus liabilities, is denoted by

$$V^i_0 = \left(c^i + \sum_{j=1}^{n} \pi_{ij} L_j + q_0 b^i - d^i - L^i\right)^+ \forall i \in N,$$

where we denote by $x^+ = \max(x, 0)$ the positive part of $x$. To simplify notation, we define $n \times 1$ vectors $d = (d^i)_{i=1}^{n}$, $c = (c^i)_{i=1}^{n}$, $b = (b^i)_{i=1}^{n}$ and $V_0 = (V^i_0)_{i=1}^{n}$. A stylized balance sheet at time $t = 0$ is shown in Figure 2. Some banks face a shortfall of $\chi^i_0 \equiv (L + d - c - q_0 b - (\Pi L))^+$, e.g., as a consequence of a natural disaster or a pandemic. Since all bank liabilities are due at $t = 1$ the insolvent banks will have to default on their obligations if they are not bailed out. We denote the set of these fundamentally defaulting banks by $F \equiv \{i | \chi^i_0 > 0\}$.

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5In practice, whether or not securities are “marked to market” (MTM) depends on whether they are categorized as “held to maturity” (HTM, evaluated at amortized cost) or “available for sale/trading” (evaluated at current market prices). In our model banks may have to sell sovereign debt to settle their liabilities in $t = 1$, so MTM is the appropriate concept.
Default Cascades

Since banks are interlinked through credit contracts, the default of one or more fundamentally defaulting banks can lead to further defaults elsewhere in the system. If bank $j$ defaults, it has to liquidate all its (interbank and other) assets and repay its creditors according to their seniority. The financial commitments $d^i$ have seniority over interbank liabilities $L^i$. Among interbank creditors, the total repayment $p^i < L^i$ is distributed pro rata, i.e. the creditor bank $i$ of a defaulting bank $j$ is repaid according to its share $\pi_{ij}$ in bank $j$’s interbank liabilities.

As in Glasserman and Young (2015) we assume that whenever a bank defaults, some of its assets are destroyed (“deadweight loss”). More precisely, the bankruptcy of bank $j$ comes at a deadweight loss of $\beta \chi_1^j$ where $\chi_1^j \equiv (L^j + d^j - c^j - q_1 b^j - \sum_{k=1}^n \pi_{jk} p^k)^+ +$ is bank $j$’s shortfall in period $t = 1$ and $\beta > 0$ a scaling parameter. The deadweight loss is increasing in the bank’s shortfall and can be interpreted as legal costs or losses due to an inefficient allocation of resources during the bankruptcy procedure.

We further assume that interbank liabilities are cleared simultaneously at $t = 1$, as in Eisenberg and Noe (2001). This leads to the following definition:

**Definition 1.** A clearing payment vector $p = (p^1, \ldots, p^n)$ for a financial system $(L, \Pi, c, d, b)$ is a fixed point of

$$p^i = \begin{cases} L^i & \text{if } c^i + q_1 b^i + \sum_{j=1}^n \pi_{ij} p^j \geq L^i + d^i \\ (c^i + q_1 b^i + \sum_{j=1}^n \pi_{ij} p^j - d^i - \beta \chi_1^i)^+ & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

6Defined in this way, the deadweight loss caused by a defaulting bank is bounded from above by the total value of its assets. This feature reflects the fact that large banks can generally cause more damage than small banks. To keep the model tractable, we focus on settings where this upper bound is not binding, i.e., $\chi_1^i$ and $\beta$ are small enough to ensure that no bank’s assets are completely wiped out in bankruptcy.
The existence of multiple, Pareto ranked clearing payment vectors in this setting follows directly from Proposition 3 in Glasserman and Young (2015). Following the standard convention in this literature, we focus on the unique Pareto dominant clearing payment \( \bar{p} \), i.e., the “best case” scenario with the highest repayments.

If the recovery value of bank \( i \)’s assets is lower than bank \( i \)’s senior obligations \( d_i \), the junior creditors receive nothing \( (\bar{p}_i = 0) \) and senior creditors suffer a loss of

\[
\delta^i(\bar{p}) = \left( d^i - \left( c^i + q_1 b^i + \sum_{j=1}^n \pi^{ij} \bar{p}^j - \beta \chi_1^i \right) \right)^+. 
\]

We define the set of defaulting banks under a clearing payment vector \( \bar{p} \) as \( D(\bar{p}) \equiv \{ i | \bar{p}_i < L^i \} \). Clearly, \( D(\bar{p}) \supseteq F \) because \( D(\bar{p}) \) can also include banks that default due to contagion effects triggered by fundamentally defaulting banks.

### 3.2 Government

In our model, the government faces a tradeoff in minimizing expected welfare losses at \( t = 1 \). On the one hand, it wants to avoid bank defaults and the associated deadweight losses. On the other hand, rescuing banks with debt-financed bailouts is also costly because liabilities are effectively moved from private to the public balance sheet, resulting in higher sovereign spreads and a higher probability of a costly sovereign default.

We assume that all sovereign debt matures in the final period \( t = 2 \) and is held either by domestic banks or risk-neutral investors (external to the network), so the (exogenous) total initial stock of sovereign debt is given by \( B_0 = \sum_{i=1}^n b^i + b_{0 \text{inv}}^0 \), where \( b_{0 \text{inv}}^0 \) denotes the holdings of risk-neutral non-bank investors.

At \( t = 1 \) the government can choose to prevent a default cascade by issuing additional debt to finance bank bailout transfers.\(^7\) More precisely, the government chooses the set \( S \subseteq N \) of surviving banks (and equivalently its complement \( S^c = N \setminus S \)) to minimize the expected welfare losses arising from bank bankruptcies and (expected) sovereign default, to be defined further below. By choosing the set of surviving banks, the government effectively also chooses (a) the unique clearing payment vector \( \bar{p}(S) : \bar{p}^i = L^i \ \forall i \in S \), and (b) the unique set of bailout transfers that is just sufficient to cover the shortfalls of all banks in \( S \):

\[
t^i(S, q_1) = \left( L^i + d^i - c^i - q_1 b^i - (\Pi \bar{p}(S))^i \right)^+ \ \forall i \in S
\]

\(^7\)Our notion of bailouts, i.e., direct transfers (equivalent to a capital injection in our model), is not the only conceivable way to prevent bank failures. For example, debt renegotiation or voluntary, incentive-compatible bail-ins of surviving creditor banks as in Bernard et al. (2018) are also appropriate resolution policies. A third alternative would be a tax-financed bailout (instead of debt-financed), which would affect the price of sovereign debt as well through a loss in GDP. The optimal bailout design is outside the scope of this paper.
To raise a given amount of total bailouts $T(S, q_1) = \sum_{i \in S} t^i(S, q_1)$, the government needs to increase the outstanding debt level to $B_1 > B_0$, so to satisfy the following budget constraint:

$$q_1(B_1 - B_0) = T(S, q_1) \tag{2}$$

In the final period $t = 2$ the government raises taxes to repay its obligations $B_1$. We assume that the government’s tax capacity (i.e., the maximum revenue it can raise) $\tilde{\tau}$ is a random variable that follows a continuous and strictly monotonic cumulative distribution function (CDF) $F(\tau)$.\(^8\) If $\tau \geq B_1$, the government raises exactly enough to repay all debt in full. If, however, $\tau < B_1$, we assume the government collects nothing and fully defaults on all its obligations, i.e. bondholders do not receive any repayment at all.\(^9\) It then follows that the probability of a sovereign default is given by $P(\text{Default}) = F(B_1) = F\left(B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1}\right)$. Because the cumulative distribution function is increasing, it follows immediately that the default probability increases with the required bailout expenditures, but decreases with respect to the bond price $q_1$. In words, a higher bond price in period $t = 1$ will make a sovereign default less likely. At the same time, however, the bond price depends on the government’s default probability in the following way: The marginal buyers of sovereign bonds are investors who discount future cash flows at the risk-free gross interest rate $R \geq 1$. Because we assume that these investors are risk-neutral and have deep pockets, the market-clearing sovereign debt price is given by

$$q_1 = \frac{1 - P(\text{Default})}{R} = \frac{1 - F\left(B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1}\right)}{R} \tag{3}$$

At this price $q_1$ risk-neutral investors are indifferent between buying the bond with expected payoff $1 - P(\text{Default})$ and the risk-free asset that guarantees the return $R$.

Equation (3) is a nonlinear equation which generally admits multiple solutions. As a result, there may exist multiple equilibrium sovereign debt prices, just like in the canonical models of self-fulfilling debt crises such as Calvo (1988) or Cole and Kehoe (2000). This multiplicity arises from the fact that both sides of equation (3) are increasing in $q_1$.

How many equilibrium prices exist depends on the parameters $R$ and $B_0$, the bailout transfer in (1) and, importantly, the shape and domain of $F(\tau)$. We make the following assumption:

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\(^8\)One interpretation would be that the government can raise any revenue it desires, but only at a stochastic cost. In this alternative scenario the government would optimally default whenever the realization of this cost exceeds some threshold.

\(^9\)This assumption buys us tractability and leads to a simple analytical expression for $q_1$. If one were to assume partial repayment, the numerator in equation (3) would also include the integral over all possible realizations of $\tilde{\tau}$ and the corresponding pro rata repayments. The economic mechanism we want to capture is qualitatively unaffected by this “all-or-nothing” assumption on tax collection.
**Assumption 1.** For a given network \((L, \Pi, c, d, b)\) and parameters \((B_0, R)\), the tax capacity \(\tilde{\tau}\) follows a Pareto distribution with a heavy tail, i.e.,

\[
F(\tau) = 1 - \left( \frac{B_0}{\tau} \right)^\alpha
\]

with \(\tau \geq B_0\) and \(\alpha < 1\).

This assumption has several implications. First of all, it imposes a lower bound on the space of possible realizations of \(\tilde{\tau}\) and implies \(F(B_0) = 0\), so it ensures that without an increase in debt the government can always repay its debt with certainty. As a consequence, without bailouts the equilibrium price in the sovereign debt market is pinned down at \(q_1 = R^{-1}\).\(^{10}\)

Second, because \(F(B_0 + \varepsilon) > 0 \ \forall \varepsilon > 0\), if public debt increases (e.g. due to a positive bailout at \(t = 1\)) the government will default at \(t = 2\) with a non-zero probability. In other words, even a small bailout always comes at the cost of increasing sovereign spreads.

Finally, as detailed in Appendix A, the parameter \(\alpha < 1\) guarantees a unique equilibrium price with bailouts \(q_1 \in (0, R^{-1})\) which is decreasing in the level of bailout expenditures, i.e., a higher price \(q_1\) can only be achieved through lower bailout expenditures and vice versa.\(^{11}\)

**Lemma 1.** Equilibrium aggregate bailout transfers \(T(S, q_1)\) and the equilibrium price of sovereign debt \(q_1\) are inversely related.

*Proof.* See Appendix B. \(\blacksquare\)

Note that we have chosen the Pareto distribution for analytical tractability, but any other distribution with sufficiently slow decay would also yield a unique equilibrium price under mild extra conditions. Even with more general distributions that would generate multiple (stable or unstable) equilibrium prices, our results would still survive locally for the doom loop equilibria with \(q_1 < R^{-1}\). For an extensive discussion, see Appendix A.1.

What remains to be defined is the initial sovereign debt price \(q_0\). We assume that market participants at \(t = 0\) cannot anticipate the government’s bailout choice, so it is not reflected in the \(t = 0\) bond price given by

\[
q_0 = \frac{1 - F(B_0)}{R} = \frac{1}{R}.
\]

\(^{10}\)This normalization is without loss of generality. When the government considers a bailout it is concerned with the implied change in its default probability, not with the level.

\(^{11}\)Strictly speaking, a “market breakdown” equilibrium in which \(q_1 = 0\) (the government defaults with certainty) always exists for \(T > 0\) as \(\lim_{\tau \to \infty} F(\tau) = 1\) because \(F(\cdot)\) is a CDF. In our analysis we deliberately ignore this extreme coordination failure.
As a consequence, whenever $T(S, q_1) > 0$, we have $q_1 < q_0$, i.e., the sovereign spread jumps up in $t = 1$. In contrast, whenever $T(S, q_1) = 0$, we have $q_1 = q_0 = 1/R$.\(^{12}\)

We are now in a position to state the government’s problem formally: It chooses the optimal subset of surviving banks to solve

$$
\min_{S \subseteq N} \quad w(S) = \beta \sum_{i \in S} \left( L^i + d^i - c^i - q_1 b^i - \sum_{j=1}^{n} \pi^{ij} \bar{p}^i(S) \right) + \gamma B_1 P(\text{Default})
$$

subject to

$$
q_1 = \frac{1 - F \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right)}{R},
$$

where the first term of the objective function contains the part of defaulting banks’ assets that is lost in bankruptcy. The parameter $\gamma > 0$ measures deadweight losses per unit of defaulted sovereign debt, and is a proxy for litigation costs and the penalty of losing access to debt markets. The two constraints indicate that the government internalizes the effect of its choice of $S$ on bailout expenditures and the bond price (jointly determined).

**The Doom Loop with Complete Bailouts**

In the first two propositions, we focus on complete bailouts, i.e., we restrict the government’s choice set to only two elements: $N$ (all banks are bailed out, so $\bar{p} = L$) or $D(\bar{p})$ (no bailout). Later in the paper, we extend the analysis to the more general case where the government can optimally choose the set of surviving banks.

Before we turn to the analysis of how the sovereign debt distribution affects the strength of the doom loop and thus the government’s bailout decision, it is helpful to define the bailout space, i.e., the set of initial shocks for which the government prefers a complete bailout to inaction in equilibrium. Since we model the adverse shock as a reduction of banks’ “cash assets”, everything else equal, a larger initial shock corresponds to a (componentwise) weakly smaller vector $c$. We can therefore define the bailout space as a subset of the space of vectors $c$ (i.e., “cash” assets) for a given network structure and parameters.

**Definition 2.** For given $(L, \Pi, b, d)$, bankruptcy cost parameter $\beta$, risk-free interest rate $R$, and fiscal parameters $(B_0, \alpha, \gamma)$, the bailout space is defined as

$$
\Psi \equiv \left\{ c \in \mathbb{R}^n : w^B < w^{NB} \right\}
$$

Note that if a monetary authority were to lower the risk-free rate $R$ it would stabilize bond prices and thus help to mitigate the impact of the doom loop. Alternative tools include outright bond purchases and collateral policy, whereby the central bank can extend the set of securities (e.g., to include more risky sovereign bonds) that banks can use as collateral to obtain lender-of-last-resort funding.
with \( w^B = w(N) \) and \( w^{NB} = w(D(\bar{\rho})^c) \).

Our main research question is how the interbank network topology and the distribution of sovereign debt jointly affect the government’s bailout choice. In the context of complete bailouts, answering this question boils down to evaluating the relative effects of sovereign debt distribution and network structure on \( w^B \) and \( w^{NB} \).

First note that in the case of complete bailouts all interbank liabilities are paid in full, so the network structure only matters for \( w^{NB} \), as the required bailout that determines \( w^B \) is independent of the network structure. In contrast, the presence and distribution of sovereign debt only affects \( w^B \) as without a bailout there is no doom loop and we have \( q_1^{NB} = 1/R \) in equilibrium. Specifically, what matters for \( w^B \) is (a) how much debt the banking sector holds, and (b) which banks hold the debt. We address both points in the following two propositions.

**Proposition 1** (Sovereign exposure and the bailout space). For an identical initial level of public debt \( B_0 \), let \( (L, \Pi, \bar{\epsilon}, d, \bar{b}) \) and \( (L, \Pi, \hat{\epsilon}, d, \hat{b}) \) be two financial systems such that

1. \( \hat{b}_i \geq \bar{b}_i \quad \forall i \in N \) with at least one inequality strict
2. \( \hat{\epsilon}_i = \bar{\epsilon}_i - (\hat{b}_i - \bar{b}_i)/R > 0 \quad \forall i \in N : \hat{b}_i > \bar{b}_i. \)

Then with complete bailouts \( \hat{w}^B \geq \bar{w}^B \) and \( \hat{\Psi} \subseteq \bar{\Psi} \).

*Proof.* See Appendix B. ■

Conditions 1 and 2 ensure that if we move from the tilde-system to the hat-system, every bank that now holds more sovereign debt holds less cash, so that the overall initial equity or shortfall positions remain unchanged \( \hat{\chi}_0 = \bar{\chi}_0 \). In other words, these banks only differ in their asset composition across the two scenarios, but not in their total asset size or leverage. The idea of the proposition is that increasing the amount of domestic sovereign debt held by banks amplifies the feedback loop between a falling debt price \( q_1 \) and even higher transfers \( T(N, q_1) \). Therefore, complete bailouts become more costly and as a result \( \Psi \) becomes smaller.\(^{13}\) Note however that \( \hat{w}^B \) is only weakly larger than \( \bar{w}^B \), because it is possible that the banks with increased sovereign exposure are well capitalized and do not require a bailout in the first place. In that case, even though their shareholders suffer higher book value losses than in the tilde-system, these do not translate into bankruptcies and hence do not affect the bailout space.

Clearly, if the banks with sovereign exposure are well capitalized, they can absorb a drop in \( q_1 \) better than poorly capitalized banks. This higher loss-absorbing capacity mitigates the

\(^{13}\) This relationship perfectly resonates with the argument in Gaballo and Zetlin-Jones (2016) that stronger “home bias” in banks’ sovereign debt portfolios reduces the government’s bailout capacity.
“doom loop”-related cost of a bailout because fewer banks need to be bailed out (see equation (1)). Even if bailing out the fundamentally defaulting banks makes additional bailouts necessary (i.e. \( t^i(N, q_1) > 0 \) for some \( i \notin F \) due to \( q_1 \downarrow \)), this bailout will still be less costly than if the sovereign debt was held entirely by the \( F \)-banks. We present an example to illustrate the economic forces at play.

Example 1. Let \( B \equiv \{ i : b^i > 0 \} \) denote the set of banks that hold sovereign debt and consider the following scenario: Suppose there is only one fundamentally defaulting bank \( i \), and all sovereign debt in the banking sector is held by a bank \( j \neq i \), so \( F \) and \( B \) would be disjoint singletons. Suppose further that the government chooses to bail out bank \( i \), thereby causing a drop in the bond price that would render bank \( j \) insolvent. Then, according to our definition of complete bailouts, the government also has to transfer bailout funds to bank \( j \in B \). However, as long as bank \( j \) initially had a positive equity buffer, the total required bailout \( (t^i + t^j) \) will be smaller than if only bank \( i \) had held the sovereign debt stock (i.e. if \( F = B = \{ i \} \) and the doom loop had hit bank \( i \) without any capital buffer mitigation.

The insight from this stylized example carries over to more dispersed distributions of sovereign debt among banks. We formally state this intuitive result in the following proposition:

Proposition 2 (Sovereign exposure and capital buffers). Let \((L, \Pi, \hat{c}, d, \hat{b})\) and \((L, \Pi, \tilde{c}, d, \tilde{b})\) be two financial systems such that

1. \( \hat{b}^i < \tilde{b}^i \ \forall i : V^i_0 < \tilde{b}^i(R^{-1} - \tilde{q}^{\max}_1) \)
2. \( \sum_{i \in N} \hat{b}^i = \sum_{i \in N} \tilde{b}^i \)
3. \( \hat{c}^i = \tilde{c}^i - (\hat{b}^i - \tilde{b}^i)/R > 0 \ \forall i \in N : \hat{b}^i < \tilde{b}^i \),

where \( \tilde{q}^{\max}_1 \) is the unique positive solution of \( R\tilde{q}^{\max}_1 = 1 - F \left( \frac{\sum_{i \in F} \chi^i_0}{\tilde{q}^{\max}_1} \right) \). Then with complete bailouts \( \hat{w}^B < \tilde{w}^B \) and \( \hat{\Psi} \supset \tilde{\Psi} \).

Proof. See Appendix B. ■

The two financial systems described in the proposition only differ in the distribution of domestic sovereign debt, with aggregate sovereign exposure in the banking system and initial shortfalls held constant (conditions 2 and 3 imply \( \hat{\chi}^i_0 = \tilde{\chi}^i_0 \equiv \chi^i_0 \)). More precisely, the banks with capital buffers \( V^j_0 \) below an exogenous threshold hold less sovereign debt in the hat-system than in the tilde-system (condition 1), which requires that banks with \( V^j_0 \) above the threshold hold more.\(^{14}\) Then, the proposition states that redistributing domestic

\(^{14}\)This threshold depends on \( \tilde{q}^{\max}_1 \), i.e., the upper bound on the bond price in case of a bailout. This is the price that would prevail if only the initial shortfall had to be covered because none of the banks in \( F \) held any sovereign debt. Hence, the banks referred to in condition 1 are those whose capital buffers could not even absorb the lowest possible drop in the sovereign bond price.
sovereign debt from weakly capitalized banks to more healthy banks makes a complete bailout less costly. The intuition behind this result is that if banks with sovereign exposure have larger capital buffers they can absorb a drop in the value of sovereign debt more easily without becoming insolvent themselves (and thus requiring a bailout). Therefore, aggregate bailouts and welfare losses are smaller.

We conclude our discussion of the benchmark case with complete bailouts by briefly touching upon the policy dimension of our findings. Proposition 2 suggests that from an ex ante perspective (with uncertainty about idiosyncratic fundamental shocks) it is socially preferable that domestic sovereign debt be held by the “safest” banks, i.e., those that are the least likely to default fundamentally. Against this backdrop, the findings in Acharya and Steffen (2015), Altavilla et al. (2017), and Crosignani (2021) that in the recent European sovereign debt crisis the most fragile banks increased their domestic sovereign exposure disproportionately becomes even more worrisome; rather than “too big to fail” they might have become “too debt-loaded to be saved”. Our results therefore provide an immediate rationale for bank capital requirements that increase with sovereign debt exposure (e.g. through non-zero risk-weights). We refer to Véron (2017) for a detailed proposal and a comprehensive survey of the policy debate.

The Doom Loop with Optimal Bailouts

Once we drop the restriction to complete bailouts, the optimization problem in (4) becomes a highly complex minimization over sets that involves several nonlinearities and fixed points. Hence, it is generally difficult to make analytical statements about the optimal set of surviving banks $S^*$. Therefore, to develop a better understanding of the economic forces that determine the government’s bailout decision, from now on we ignore the “global” solution of (4) and focus instead on “local” analysis in the following sense: Suppose that instead of choosing the optimal subset among all feasible subsets of surviving banks, the government could only bail out one bank at a time. Starting from the laissez faire outcome with defaulting banks $D(\bar{p})$, the government computes for every troubled bank the net welfare gain that would result from bailing it out. As long as a reduction in welfare losses is possible in this way, the government adds the bank with the highest net welfare gain to the set of surviving banks. The procedure stops once there is no troubled bank left that can be bailed out without increasing welfare losses.

There is no guarantee that the set thus constructed coincides with the “globally” optimal set $S^*$ which solves (4). However, the fictional sequential procedure allows us to at least

\footnote{Of course, it is possible to solve (4) numerically. For details about the algorithm we use, see Appendix D.}

\footnote{Borgatti (2006) calls this the “ensemble problem”: The optimal set of nodes for a given optimization problem is not necessarily the set of optimal banks when considered individually.}
analyze “local” optima, i.e., we can pin down bank-specific properties that determine which bank will be bailed out at any given step of the procedure. In this way, even though it is impossible to characterize the global solution of the optimal bailout problem analytically, we can make valid statements about incremental improvements.

We begin the analysis with a useful decomposition of the net welfare effect of bailing out bank $i$ which we call $\Delta^i w$. On the one hand, the bailout brings a benefit by not only avoiding direct bankruptcy deadweight losses $\beta \chi^i_1$, but also by increasing bank $i$’s interbank repayments from $\bar{p}^i$ to $L^i$, thus reducing the shortfalls and deadweight losses of $i$’s creditors, their creditors, and so forth. Some troubled banks may even become solvent as a result. On the other hand, the bailout comes at a cost: First, the increase in sovereign debt implies a lower sovereign debt price $q_1$ and a higher probability of sovereign default; second, the drop in $q_1$ increases the shortfalls and deadweight losses in other banks that are still insolvent after bailing out bank $i$. We refer to these two sources of welfare losses, respectively, as $\gamma$-component and $\beta$-component, named after their respective coefficients in the social welfare function (4). In what follows we first elaborate on all components individually before we state the decomposition in a lemma.

We start with an observation about the benefit of bailing out bank $i$: For a given set of surviving banks $S$, by bailing out bank $i \in S^c$ the government avoids bankruptcy deadweight losses of

$$\beta \sum_{j \in I} \left[ \chi^j_1 + (L^j - \bar{p}^j(S)) \times \left( \sum_k \pi^{kj} + (1 + \beta) \sum_k \sum_l \pi^{lk} \pi^{kj} + (1 + \beta)^2 \sum_k \sum_l \sum_m \pi^{ml} \pi^{lk} \pi^{kj} + \ldots \right) \right],$$

where $I$ denotes the set of banks that become solvent through the bailout (with $i \in I$) and all summations except the first are over the remaining default set $S^c \setminus I$. The expression in (5) captures (a) the direct impact of avoiding bankruptcy deadweight losses $\beta \chi^i_1$ for banks in $I$, and (b) the indirect impact of their increased interbank repayments. The idea is that the increase in repayments from $\bar{p}^j(S)$ to $L^j$ not only increases $j$’s creditors’ assets available for repayment, but also reduces their shortfall and hence their deadweight losses. For example, if bank $j$ fully repays, its creditor $k$’s shortfall decreases by $\pi^{kj}(L^j - \bar{p}^j(S))$ and its repayment $\bar{p}^k$ even increases by $(1 + \beta)\pi^{kj}(L^j - \bar{p}^j(S))$, and so on. In other words, the positive effect of the bailout travels through the subnetwork of defaulting banks and is amplified by the bankruptcy cost coefficient $\beta$ at each node.

Even though we are concerned with minimizing welfare losses, we define the net welfare effect such that $\Delta^i w$ is positive if bailing out bank $i$ is beneficial.
The expression in (5) can be further simplified. Observe that the increase in interbank re-
payments is bounded from above by \( L_j \), namely if bank \( j \) originally could not even partially 
repay its interbank liabilities (\( \bar{p}_j(S) = 0 \)). Otherwise, that is if \( \bar{p}_j(S) > 0 \ \forall j \in I : L_j > 0 \), we 
can use Definition 1 to show that \( L_j - \bar{p}_j(S) = (1 + \beta) \chi_1^j \). For ease of notation we restrict 
our subsequent analysis to the latter case, so that the expression in (5) becomes

\[
\beta \sum_{j\in I} \chi_1^j \left( 1 + (1 + \beta) \sum_k \pi^{kj} + (1 + \beta)^2 \sum_k \sum_l \pi^{lk} \pi^{kj} + \ldots \right) 
\]

(6)

We remark, however, that our results would qualitatively also hold in the general case where 
j’s depositors incur losses, i.e., if there exists some bank \( j \) with positive interbank liabilities 
\( L_j > 0 \) which makes zero payments to its creditors in the network.

Borrowing from Glasserman and Young (2015), we refer to the term in parentheses as the “node depth” of bank \( j \) and denote it by \( C^j \) which stands for “centrality”. Node depth measures the extent to which any loss originating at bank \( j \) gets spread and amplified in the subnetwork of defaulting banks. Therefore, it is naturally increasing in the set of defaulting banks, i.e., for a given network \( \Pi \), node depth of any individual bank is weakly higher if more banks default. Let \( D \) be a set of defaulting nodes, and \( \Pi_D \) be the \( |D| \times |D| \) matrix obtained by restricting the relative liabilities matrix \( \Pi \) to \( D \). Moreover, denote by \( I_D \) be the \( |D| \times |D| \) identity matrix, and let \( \Pi'_D \) denote the transpose of matrix \( \Pi \). Conditional on \( D \), the vector of node depths of banks in \( D \) is given by \( I_D - (1 + \beta) \Pi'_D \). If the spectral radius of \( (1 + \beta) \Pi'_D \) is less than one. This technical condition has a clear economic interpretation: For node depth to be well defined, the entries of the relative liability matrix of the defaulting banks \( \Pi'_D \) have to be sufficiently small, i.e., the defaulting banks need to owe a sufficient fraction of their liabilities to solvent banks outside of \( D \). The higher the bankruptcy cost parameter \( \beta \), the lower the relative exposures within the defaulting set must be.\(^{18}\)

Another interpretation is that solvent banks are required to act as a valve to absorb some of the losses in the interbank market. Otherwise there would be too much amplification of welfare losses within \( D \) and the series in (5) and (6) would not converge. For example, if the set of defaulting banks had a ring structure with \( \pi^{ij} = 1 \) if \( j = i + 1 \), modulo \( n \), node depth could not be computed using the matrix inversion formula given above. Rather than fading out, any dollar of shortfall at a given bank would be fully transmitted and amplified at every node as it travels through the ring until all assets are wiped out. In contrast, if the interbank network is complete and symmetric with \( \pi^{ij} = \frac{1}{n-1} \ \forall i, j \in N \), node depth can be computed as

\(^{18}\)We derive formal conditions for two- and three-dimensional default sets in Appendix C.
long as the total number of banks $n$ exceeds the number of defaulting banks by a sufficient amount. The critical number of banks increases with the bankruptcy cost parameter $\beta$.

There is an interesting analogy between the concept of node depth and other, more standard network metrics such as eigenvector or Katz-Bonacich centrality. First, just like eigenvector centrality, a bank’s node depth is a weighted sum of the node depths of its creditors, with weights given by the relative liability matrix $\Pi'$ (recall that $\pi_{ki}$ measures the share of $k$'s claim in $j$'s total interbank liabilities). Intuitively, a bank’s node depth is higher if that bank has higher liabilities to defaulting banks that have themselves high liabilities to other defaulting banks. Second, similarly to the attenuation coefficient in Katz-Bonacich centrality, the factor $(1 + \beta)$ controls the effect of path length on the relationship between different nodes’ centralities. We refer to section 9.3 of Glasserman and Young (2016) for more details.

From an economic perspective, the expression in (6) suggests that the benefit per dollar spent is the largest if targeted at banks with (a) high potential to avoid contagious defaults (i.e., a large set $I$), and (b) high centrality in the sense of node depth. However, a comprehensive analysis of the government’s tradeoff also requires to analyze the cost of a bailout.

We begin by considering the $\gamma$-component, i.e., the part of the cost that is directly related to the pecuniary expenditure the bailout of bank $i$ requires. The increase in the level of public debt (and thus in the sovereign default probability) depends on four items: First of all, from equation (1) we can see that, ceteris paribus, a larger shortfall $\chi_i$ clearly requires higher bailout expenditures and thus leads to a sharper increase in the sovereign default probability and a sharper drop in the bond price $q_1$. Second, there is a doom loop multiplier effect: a higher sovereign exposure $b_i$ also leads to higher bailout expenditures because every dollar raised for the bailout of bank $i$ increases its effective shortfall by an amount proportional to $b_i$. Therefore, even for identical shortfalls, bailing out banks with more sovereign debt on their balance sheets comes with a higher $\gamma$-component than bailing out low-exposure banks. We refer to Appendix B for a formal proof of this “doom loop multiplier” property. Third, depending on the sovereign exposure of banks in $S$, it may happen that the drop in $q_1$ makes additional bailout transfers to other banks necessary to prevent their insolvency. The cost of raising these funds will also be reflected in the $\gamma$-component. Fourth and finally, it matters whether or not bank $i$ is part of a cycle in the subnetwork of defaulting banks $S^c$. If so, then bailing out $i$ eventually also increases the interbank repayments it receives, thereby reducing the effective shortfall the government needs to cover according to (1). Summing up, to minimize the $\gamma$-component of the bailout cost, the government would ideally bail out banks that have only a low shortfall to begin with, hold little sovereign debt, and have interbank claims on other defaulting banks that have themselves (direct or indirect) claims on the bailout candidate.
To complete the picture, we turn to the $\beta$-component which describes the additional bankruptcy deadweight losses that are triggered by the drop in the price of the sovereign bond, which we denote by $\Delta q_1 < 0$. The bailout of bank $i$ causes deadweight losses in the amount of $|\beta \Delta q_1 b^i|$ for each defaulting bank $j \in S^c \setminus I$ which will then be amplified in proportion to their centrality $C^j$. This means that the side effects of a bailout can become very costly if the remaining defaulters are highly exposed to their government and very central in the subnetwork of defaulting banks. It is exactly this key observation that will give rise to our main result further below.

**Lemma 2** (Decomposition of net welfare effect). For a given initial set of surviving banks $S$, the net welfare effect $\Delta^i w$ of bailing out bank $i \in S^c$ can be written as

$$
\Delta^i w = \beta \sum_{j \in I} \chi^i_1 \times C^j + \beta \sum_{j \in S^c \setminus I} \Delta^i q_1 b^i \times C^j - \gamma \Delta^i (B_1 P(\text{Default})),
$$

where $\Delta q_1 < 0$ and $\Delta^i (B_1 P(\text{Default})) > 0$ denote changes implied by the bailout of $i$.

The lemma allows us to make a number of statements about which banks deliver the highest welfare improvements if bailed out. For example, note that in an economy without bank-held domestic sovereign debt ($b = 0$), the $\beta$-component would disappear and banks could be ranked in terms of network spillovers only. More precisely, among two banks $i$ and $j$ with the same shortfall (i.e., $\chi^i_1 = \chi^j_1$) and the same set of contagious defaults ($I \setminus i = J \setminus j$) the $\gamma$-component would be identical for both banks. The government would then prefer to bail out the bank with higher node depth $C$.$^{19}$ Our model thus supports the claim that banks with high liabilities to other weakly capitalized banks can be “too interconnected to fail”.

Another thought experiment (again with $b = 0$) helps to emphasize the role of node depth and hence network structure: Consider two banks with the same node depth ($C^i = C^j$), but such that $i$ has a larger shortfall without a bailout than $j$, so $\chi^i_1 > \chi^j_1$. Depending on model parameters (in particular for sufficiently high $\gamma$) it is possible that the government prefers to bail out bank $j$ if both banks’ centrality is low, but it prefers bank $i$ if their centrality is sufficiently high. The reason is that the benefit of a bailout is proportional to the bank’s centrality while the fiscal cost ($\gamma$-component) is not. Therefore, if centrality is low, the higher $\gamma$-component of bailing out $i$ can dominate the government’s decision, but with sufficiently high centrality the higher benefit overcompensates the increased sovereign default risk.

$^{19}$This insight echos a number of results from the more general literature about intervention in networks. For instance, Galeotti et al. (2020) show that in network games of strategic complements, the optimal intervention allocated to a given node is proportional to its eigenvector centrality.
In what follows we often compare two banks or two entire financial systems that are identical in all but one dimension. This allows us to isolate specific channels and derive precise analytical results.

**Sovereign Debt Distribution and Network Centrality**

This section analyzes how network centrality interacts with the distribution of sovereign debt and hence with the doom loop. Before we study non-degenerate, dispersed distributions of sovereign debt we consider the simple benchmark in which every bank has the same exposure to the government.

**Proposition 3** (Uniform sovereign debt distribution). Let \((L, \Pi, \hat{c}, d, \hat{b})\) and \((\bar{L}, \bar{\Pi}, \bar{\hat{c}}, \bar{d}, \bar{\hat{b}})\) be two financial systems such that

1. \(\hat{b} = 0\)
2. \(\hat{b}^k = b' > 0 \ \forall k \in N\)
3. \(\hat{c} = \bar{c} - \hat{b} / R\) (which implies \(\bar{\chi}_1 = \bar{\chi}_1 \equiv \chi_1\)).

Moreover, let \(i, j \in S^c\) be two banks that differ only in their node depth, with \(C^i > C^j\). In particular, they have identical shortfalls \(\chi^i_1 = \chi^j_1\) and cause the same set of contagious defaults \(I \setminus i = J \setminus j\). Then we have

\[
\bar{\Delta}^i w > \Delta^i w, \quad \bar{\Delta}^j w > \Delta^j w, \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{\Delta}^i w - \bar{\Delta}^j w > \Delta^i w - \Delta^j w.
\]

**Proof.** See Appendix B.

In the proposition, the tilde-system captures the setting described above without any sovereign exposure (condition 1), so there is no \(\beta\)-component to consider. For two banks with identical shortfalls and identical contagious defaults, the difference in node depth \(C^i > C^j\) breaks the tie, so the government prefers to bail out bank \(i\). The hat-system, in contrast, features a uniform sovereign debt distribution across banks (conditions 2 and 3). The proposition states that the presence of domestic sovereign exposure on banks’ balance sheets - even if it is uniformly distributed - strengthens the role of centrality as a driver of the government’s optimal decision. If bailing out bank \(i\) is preferred to bailing out \(j\) in the scenario without the doom loop, it is also preferred with the doom loop, but not vice versa. The reason is that now, on top of a higher benefit, bailing out bank \(i\) is associated with a lower \(\beta\)-component than bailing out bank \(j\) (remember that the \(\beta\)-component is increasing in defaulting banks’ centrality). Put differently, even a highly symmetric sovereign debt distribution amplifies the “too interconnected to fail” problem.
Equipped with this general result on the interaction of centrality and sovereign exposure, we next consider asymmetric distributions of domestic sovereign debt. Does the government prefer to bail out banks with more or less domestic sovereign debt? From Lemma 2 we know that domestic sovereign bonds on a bank’s balance sheet have two counteracting effects: On the one hand, high sovereign exposure $b_i$ makes it financially costly to bail out bank $i$ because every bailout dollar transferred to bank $i$ lowers $q_1$ and hence further increases $i$’s shortfall. This “doom loop multiplier” effect (which translates into a high $\gamma$-component) is stronger for larger $b_i$. On the other hand, high sovereign exposure also generates welfare losses through the $\beta$-component if bank $i$ is not bailed out, especially if $i$’s node depth is high. In other words, a higher $b_i$ increases the effective shortfall of bank $i$ and hence the required bailout expenditures, but it can also make it extremely socially costly not to save bank $i$ in a partial bailout.

Therefore, whether a given bank $i \in B$ will optimally be bailed out depends on the relative strength of these two forces. Crucially, whereas the first effect applies to each bank equally, the second effect is proportional to a bank’s network centrality. In particular, a bank with high centrality and sovereign exposure is more likely to be bailed out than an identical bank with little or no exposure. In contrast, peripheral banks (for which the second effect is negligible) are unambiguously less likely to be saved the more sovereign bonds they hold. We formalize this main result in the following proposition.

**Proposition 4** (Sovereign debt distribution within networks). Let $i, j \in S^c$ be two banks that differ only in their asset composition ($b_i > b_j$ and $c_i < c_j$). In particular, they have identical shortfalls $\chi_i = \chi_j \equiv \chi_1$ and centrality $C_i \equiv C_j \equiv C$ and cause the same set of contagious defaults $I \setminus i = J \setminus j$. Then $\exists C^*$ such that

$$\Delta_i w > \Delta_j w \iff C \geq C^*$$

as long as $\frac{b_i}{b_j} > \frac{\Delta q_1}{\Delta q_1} > 1$. The threshold $C^*$ is increasing in $\gamma$ and decreasing in $\beta$.

*Proof.* See Appendix B. ■

If the government has to choose between two otherwise identical banks, whether it will pick the one with more or less domestic sovereign exposure depends on the banks’ centrality $C$. The reason is that the welfare losses due to the $\beta$-component (which are higher if bank $j$ with the smaller sovereign exposure is saved) are proportional to centrality $C$, as shown in Lemma 2. Hence, for large $C$ the difference in $\beta$-components dominates the difference in the $\gamma$-components so that bailing out bank $i$ becomes more attractive. In contrast, for peripheral banks (low $C$) the $\beta$-component carries only little weight in the welfare comparison and the lower $\gamma$-component leads the government to bail out bank $j$. 

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Table 1: Balance sheet structure of banks in the network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(c^i)</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b^i)</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((\pi L)^i)</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total assets</strong></td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d^i)</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(L^i)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total liabilities</strong></td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equity</strong></td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta^i w)</td>
<td>-4.39</td>
<td>-4.16</td>
<td>8.07</td>
<td>7.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Banks 1 and 3 hold more sovereign debt than 2 and 4, respectively.

Finally, note that our proposition requires that the difference in sovereign exposures must overcompensate the difference in absolute price changes, i.e. \(b^i\) and \(b^j\) must be sufficiently different. Otherwise the fact that saving bank \(i\) has a stronger price impact (\(|\Delta q^i_0| > |\Delta q^j_0|\)) dominates the \(\beta\)-component so that the government unambiguously prefers to save bank \(j\), regardless of centrality.

We illustrate the result through a stylized numerical example with \(n = 4\) banks: Suppose the government initially owes a debt stock of \(B_0 = 120\) (which may be interpreted as 120% of GDP), of which 20% is held by the domestic banking sector, so \(\sum_{i \in N} b^i = 24\). The gross risk-free interest rate is \(R = 1.02\), hence the initial sovereign bond price is given by \(q_0 = R^{-1} = 0.9804\). Moreover, we pick the shape parameter of the (Pareto) tax capacity distribution to be \(\alpha = 0.9\) which delivers quantitatively reasonable movements in sovereign spreads.

Table 1 summarizes banks’ initial balance sheets (i.e. before the unexpected fundamental shock happens). Total balance sheet size is chosen such that the average bank holds 10% of its balance sheet in domestic sovereign debt, similar to Italy in Figure 1. To maintain transparency and simplicity, we initially let every bank have the same balance sheet size and leverage (equity buffer = 10% of total assets). Note, however, that banks 1 and 3 each hold twice as much sovereign debt as the remaining banks.

The interbank network is visualized in Figure 3. Banks 1 and 2 have no interbank liabilities, but are lending to banks 3 and 4. All four banks’ “cash” assets are reduced by the shock such that their total assets drop by 20%, leaving them with a shortfall of 10% each.\(^{20}\) Summing up, this is the simplest possible setup to demonstrate the content of the proposition; we have two sets of almost identical failing banks (1 vs. 2 and 3 vs. 4) that only differ in terms of sovereign exposure within pairs. In particular, banks 1 and 2 have a trivial node

\(^{20}\)To make the local analysis interesting, we picked the deadweight loss parameters \(\beta = 0.8\) and \(\gamma = 0.7\) such that the optimal bailout is a partial bailout of banks 3 and 4, i.e. banks 1 and 2 default in equilibrium.
Figure 3: Banks 3 and 4 each borrow from 1 and 2.

depth of $C^1 = C^2 = 1$ (because they do not have any interbank liabilities) whereas banks 3 and 4 have $C^3 = C^4 = 2.8$. Just like the proposition states, among the peripheral banks the government prefers bailing out the low-$b$ bank 2 ($\Delta^2 w = -4.16$) to the high-$b$ bank 1 ($\Delta^1 w = -4.39$), but among the more central banks it prefers the high-$b$ bank 3 ($\Delta^3 w = 8.07$) to the low-$b$ bank 4 ($\Delta^4 w = 7.83$).

One interpretation of the result in Proposition 4 is that the doom loop alters the government’s ranking of banks to be rescued. Whereas in a world without the doom loop (e.g., with $b = 0$), the government would be indifferent between two banks with the same shortfall $\chi_1$ and node depth $C$, the different exposures to the doom loop now break the tie. In other words, network centrality alone is not sufficient anymore to pin down the optimal set of bailed-out banks. This highlights the doom loop as a new channel of contagion that conventional centrality measures cannot capture.

Another way of looking at the effect of holding more domestic sovereign debt is across networks (whereas Proposition 4 is based on a within-network comparison). To this end we consider two financial systems that are identical in every regard, except that an arbitrary defaulting bank $i$ holds more sovereign debt in one system that in the other (conditions 1 and 2 below). To keep the overall surplus of the system unchanged, suppose that this bank holds less cash so that its overall shortfall remains unchanged (condition 3). The following proposition shows that whether the higher $b^i$ in the second system increases or decreases bank $i$’s position in the government’s “bailout ranking” depends on its centrality.

**Proposition 5** (Sovereign debt distribution across networks). For a fixed $B_0$, let $(L, \Pi, \bar{c}, d, \bar{b})$ and $(L, \Pi, \tilde{c}, d, \tilde{b})$ be two financial systems such that

1. $\exists i \in S^c : \tilde{b}^i > \bar{b}^i$
2. \( \hat{b}^j = \tilde{b}^j \) and \( \hat{c}^j = \tilde{c}^j \) \( \forall j \neq i \)

3. \( \hat{c}^i = \tilde{c}^i - (\hat{b}^i - \tilde{b}^i) / R \).

Then \( \forall j \neq i \exists C^*(j) \) such that

\[
\hat{\Delta}^i w - \hat{\Delta}^j w > \tilde{\Delta}^i w - \tilde{\Delta}^j w \quad \text{iff} \quad C^i \geq C^*(j).
\]

The threshold is increasing in \( \gamma \) and decreasing in \( \beta \), \( |\hat{\Delta}^iq_1| \) and \( (\hat{b}^i - \tilde{b}^i) \).

Proof. See Appendix B.

The above proposition can be easily explained thanks to the decomposition in Lemma 2. The benefit component is the same in both networks. On the cost side, in the hat-network bailing out bank \( i \) results in a larger \( \beta \)-component and a larger \( \gamma \)-component than in the tilde-network because of the doom loop multiplier and the corresponding larger price impact. As a consequence, the absolute net benefit of bailing out \( i \) is clearly lower in the hat-network, i.e. \( \hat{\Delta}^i w < \tilde{\Delta}^i w \). However, all other bailout candidates \( j \) also see their \( \beta \)-component increase (and thus their \( \Delta^j w \) fall) because the defaulting \( i \) now holds more sovereign debt. Moreover, this increase in the \( \beta \)-component is an increasing function of \( i \)'s centrality. Hence, if \( i \) is central enough it can even end up higher in the government’s ranking than before.

Summing up, our results show that a higher \( b^i \) does not make a bailout of \( i \) more attractive in absolute terms, nor does it increase the government’s propensity to engage in a bailout in the first place. However, it can make bailing out other banks even less attractive, namely if \( i \) is sufficiently central in the interbank network.

### 3.3 Sovereign Debt Exposure: A Strategic Tool?

Even though we do not model banks’ optimal behavior explicitly, the results outlined in the previous section have important implications for banks’ strategic portfolio choice \textit{ex ante}. We have shown that, depending on a bank’s centrality, higher sovereign exposure can make a bailout of that bank more likely \textit{ex post}. Hence, if banks value the prospect of a bailout and anticipate the government’s best response, they can use their sovereign debt portfolio to affect the odds of being bailed out.

One way to illustrate this in the context of Proposition 4 is the following: Suppose that at \( t = -1 \) banks learn their position in the interbank network (and hence their node depth for each shock realization) and can choose their domestic sovereign exposure. In terms of Proposition 4, a given bank can choose to be either bank \( i \) or bank \( j \). Then, banks with high centrality can increase the chance to be bailed out by purchasing more sovereign debt than...
otherwise identical banks. Moreover, the fact that the threshold \( C^* \) is decreasing in \( \beta \) implies that this result applies to more banks in financial systems where bankruptcy costs are higher.

Put differently, our results suggest that systemically important banks may have an incentive to load up on domestic sovereign debt to drive up the cost of bailing out others, but not them. In doing so, they can change the government’s “bailout ranking” in their favor.\(^{21}\)

4 Conclusion

In this paper we study the government’s optimal bailout strategy in a banking crisis if (a) financing a bailout depresses the value of domestic sovereign debt on bank balance sheets (the “doom loop”) and (b) banks are connected to each other through a network of liabilities.

We find, not surprisingly, that the doom loop is weaker (and bailouts therefore less costly) if banks hold less domestic sovereign debt or if banks with large domestic sovereign exposure are well capitalized. This result is directly related to the current debate about higher regulatory capital charges for sovereign exposure in the eurozone (see Véron (2017)).

Moreover, we show that the government can rank otherwise identical banks according to their “node depth”, a centrality measure introduced by Glasserman and Young (2015). Compared to a situation without sovereign debt on banks’ balance sheets, even a uniform distribution of sovereign debt across banks strengthens the role of centrality as a tiebreaker and thus exacerbates the “too-interconnected to fail” problem.

Our main result is that the optimal subset of banks to bail out depends jointly on their position in the interbank network and their domestic sovereign exposure. In particular, if banks with high amounts of sovereign bonds are sufficiently central, the government may prefer to save them rather than banks with low domestic sovereign exposure, even though this requires a larger bailout. Equivalently, if there is a bailout, highly central banks are more likely to be part of it if they hold more sovereign debt since that increases the cost of letting them fail. While higher sovereign exposure unambiguously makes a bailout of a given bank more expensive, it can make bailing out other banks instead even more costly.

As a consequence, we argue that a bank’s position in the network may have strategic implications for its individually optimal domestic sovereign exposure. Systemically important banks might be able to use domestic sovereign debt as a “strategic tool” to increase the likelihood of being bailed out. Our model therefore provides a new, network-based perspective on the question of why banks in stressed European countries increased their domestic sovereign bond holdings during the European sovereign debt crisis.

\(^{21}\)Of course, this is just one possible explanation. In fact, there are many more factors driving banks’ sovereign home bias, such as the “risk-shifting” argument in Crosignani (2021). Which explanation is relevant in any particular country is ultimately an empirical question. Unfortunately, due to their highly confidential nature, robust data on bilateral interbank exposures are notoriously hard to obtain.
Our framework may be extended along several interesting dimensions. An obvious, yet ambitious extension is to develop a fully fledged game theoretical model, in which banks take their position in the network as given and strategically choose their sovereign bond holdings to maximize an exogenously specified objective function. Banks would thus endogenously construct their balance sheet in anticipation of government intervention to maximize their bailout option.

Second, our model deliberately abstracts from the “real economy loop” in Brunnermeier et al. (2016). We do not consider the fact that bank failures could also affect the sovereign’s creditworthiness without bailouts through a reduction in lending, an investment slump, and reduced tax capacity. Incorporating this channel in our model would increase the direct macroeconomic social benefits of a bailout ceteris paribus. A similar channel would work in the opposite direction and make bailouts less attractive: Rising sovereign spreads (e.g. triggered by a bailout) tend to be passed through to corporate spreads and household borrowing rates. This “crowding out” effect, documented for example in Demirci et al. (2019), might eventually lead to lower tax revenue and thus even higher spreads.

The magnitude of each of these effects is affected by the structure of interbank lending and patterns of bank ownership of assets. Real economy effects on any bank can, for instance, be amplified or dampened by the structure of the banking network. Future research should be directed at integrating both real economy and network effects. It is clear that omitting either gives an incomplete picture. Our analysis in an idealized model where we have abstracted from real economy effects highlights that the banking network structure plays a key role, and thus models based on a single representative bank can be misleading.

References


**A Graphical Illustration and the Tax Capacity Function**

Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium in the sovereign debt market and the result from Lemma 1 graphically for different bailout amounts. For positive bailout $\hat{T}$ (solid line), a locally stable equilibrium price $q_1^\hat{T} = \hat{q}_1 < 1/R$ emerges. Most importantly, note that higher bailout expenditures $\hat{T} > \hat{T}$ shift the curve downwards (dashed line) and reduce the equilibrium debt price to $\hat{q}_1 < \hat{q}_1$. Because from equation (1) the required bailout amount is inversely related to $q_1$, the figure illustrates how the doom loop operates in the model: Bailouts lead to
higher spreads \((q_1 \downarrow)\) which in turn increases the required bailout expenditures. This pushes down \(q_1\) further and so forth.

**A.1 What assumptions do we need for a unique equilibrium price?**

We want the graph of the function on the right-hand side of equation (3) to (a) start above the 45\(^{\circ}\) line, and (b) to be strictly concave in \(q_1\). Since the price is bounded in \([0, R^{-1}]\), these two conditions guarantee a single intersection with the 45\(^{\circ}\) line and hence a unique fixed point of equation (3). In the following, we derive general conditions on the tax capacity function \(F(\cdot)\) that deliver these two results and we show that the Pareto distribution with shape parameter \(\alpha < 1\) satisfies these conditions.

Property (a) requires that

\[
\lim_{q_1 \to 0} \frac{\partial}{\partial q_1} \left( 1 - \frac{F(B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1})}{R} \right) > 1 \tag{7}
\]

Taking the derivative with respect to \(q_1\) (ignoring the fact that \(T(S, q_1)\) is piecewise linear and therefore not differentiable everywhere) yields

\[
\lim_{q_1 \to 0} -\frac{1}{R} \left( T'(S, q_1)q_1 - T(S, q_1) \right) \frac{f \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right)}{q_1^2} > 1,
\]
where \(f(\cdot)\) is the density associated with cdf \(F(\cdot)\). This can be rewritten as

\[
-\frac{1}{R} \lim_{q_1 \to 0} \left( T'(S, q_1)q_1 - T(S, q_1) \right) \times \lim_{q_1 \to 0} \frac{f \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right)}{q_1^2} > 1,
\]

where we are using the fact that the limit of a product is equal to the product of the limits if one limit is non-zero and the other infinite or if both are finite. Since the first term converges to a positive constant for \(q_1 \to 0\), it is sufficient for the statement to be true if the second limit is infinite, i.e. if

\[
\lim_{q_1 \to 0} \frac{f \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right)}{q_1^2} = \infty \quad (8)
\]

In other words, for the tax capacity distribution to satisfy (7) it needs to follow a power law with sufficiently slow polynomial decay.

As an example, consider the standard Pareto function with the pdf \(f(x) = \frac{\alpha x^\alpha}{x_m^{\alpha+1}}\) where \(x_m\) is the minimum value that \(x\) can take (\(B_0\) in this paper) and \(\alpha > 0\) the so-called shape parameter. The above requirement now reads

\[
\lim_{q_1 \to 0} \frac{\alpha B_0^\alpha}{q_1^2 \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right)^{\alpha+1}} = \lim_{q_1 \to 0} \frac{\alpha B_0^\alpha}{q_1^{1-\alpha} (B_0 q_1 + T(S, q_1))^{\alpha+1}} = \frac{\alpha B_0^\alpha}{T(0)^{\alpha+1}} \lim_{q_1 \to 0} q_1^{\alpha-1} = \infty
\]

Note that for \(\alpha < 1\), our sufficient condition in (8) holds whereas for \(\alpha > 1\) the limit is zero which would violate (7). For \(\alpha = 1\) the limit is finite at \(B_0 / T(S, 0)^2\) which also contradicts (8), but \(\frac{B_0}{R T(S, 0)} > 1\) is still possible, so (7) might still be satisfied. Hence, \(\alpha < 1\) is sufficient, but not necessary for (7) to hold.

For property (b), strict concavity, we need

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial q_1} \frac{1-F\left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right)}{R} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial^2}{\partial q_1^2} \frac{1-F\left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right)}{R} < 0. \quad (9)
\]

The first expression is equal to

\[
-\frac{1}{R} \left( T'(S, q_1)q_1 - T(S, q_1) \right) \frac{f \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right)}{q_1^2} > 0
\]

because \(f(\cdot)\) is a probability density function (non-negative) and \(T(S, q_1)\) is non-negative and decreasing in \(q_1\). In the following, we derive a sufficient condition on \(f(\cdot)\) such that
the second derivative in (9) is negative. Differentiating the previous expression again with respect to $q_1$ yields the requirement that $\forall q_1 \in [0, R^{-1}]
\begin{align*}
- \frac{1}{R} \left[ \frac{T''(S, q_1)q_1^3 - 2q_1(T'(S, q_1)q_1 - T(S, q_1))}{q_1^4} + \left( \frac{T'(S, q_1)q_1 - T(S, q_1)}{q_1^2} \right)^2 \frac{f'(B_0 + T(S, q_1)/q_1)}{f(B_0 + T(S, q_1)/q_1)} \right] < 0
\end{align*}

Since from (1) $T(S, q_1)$ is a piecewise linear function of $q_1$, its second derivative is zero (we ignore again the non-differentiable points), so the previous expression can be simplified to

$$-2 \left( T'(S, q_1)q_1 - T(S, q_1) \right) f \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right) + \frac{(T'(S, q_1)q_1 - T(S, q_1))^2}{q_1} f' \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right) > 0$$

Dividing by the term in brackets yields

$$-2f \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right) + \frac{T'(S, q_1)q_1 - T(S, q_1)}{q_1} f' \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right) < 0,$$

where the inequality sign has changed because the divisor is negative. This is equivalent to

$$\frac{2}{q_1} \frac{T'(S, q_1)q_1 - T(S, q_1)}{q_1^2} f' \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right) = \frac{\partial}{\partial q_1} \log f \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right),$$

which has to hold for all $q_1 \in [0, R^{-1}]$. Rearranging finally yields the necessary condition

$$\frac{f' \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right)}{f \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right)} < \psi(q_1) \equiv \frac{2q_1}{T(S, q_1) - T'(S, q_1)q_1} \quad \forall q_1 \in [0, R^{-1}]$$

For $q_1$ such that $f'(\cdot) > 0$ the condition clearly holds true because $f(\cdot) > 0$. However, for $q_1$ such that $f'(\cdot) < 0$ (i.e., in particular for low $q_1$ because $\lim_{x \to \infty} f(x) = 0$) we need the fraction on the left-hand side to be small enough. In other words, the decay of the density needs to be sufficiently slow whenever the density decreases (not just asymptotically).

Again, let us verify condition (9) for the Pareto distribution. Recall that the pdf of a Pareto distributed random variable $x$ takes the form $f(x) = \frac{\alpha B_0^\alpha}{x^{\alpha+1}}$ in our case. We have to make sure that

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial q_1} \log f \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right) < \frac{2}{q_1} \quad \forall q_1 \in [0, R^{-1}].$$
For the Pareto distribution this condition becomes

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial q_1} \log \left[ \alpha B_0^q \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right)^{-(\alpha+1)} \right] < \frac{2}{q_1} \quad \forall q_1 \in [0, R^{-1}]
\]

which can be simplified to

\[-(\alpha + 1) \frac{\partial}{\partial q_1} \log \left( B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} \right) < \frac{2}{q_1} \quad \forall q_1 \in [0, R^{-1}]\]

Taking the derivative and simplifying yields

\[
\frac{T(S, q_1) - T'(S, q_1)q_1}{B_0q_1 + T(S, q_1)} = \frac{T(S, q_1) - T'(S, q_1)}{B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1}} < \frac{2}{\alpha + 1} \quad \forall q_1 \in [0, R^{-1}]
\]

which, using (2), can be rewritten as

\[
\frac{(B_1 - B_0) - T'(S, q_1)}{B_1} < \frac{2}{\alpha + 1} \quad \forall q_1 \in [0, R^{-1}]
\]

Finally, we simplify and get

\[
\frac{B_0 + T'(S, q_1)}{\alpha + 1} > \frac{\alpha - 1}{\alpha + 1} B_1 \quad \forall q_1 \in [0, R^{-1}]
\]

because the change in aggregate bailouts is equal to \(T'(S, q_1) = -\sum_{i \in D(\beta)} b_i\) which is strictly smaller in absolute value than the overall initial level of outstanding sovereign debt \(B_0\) by assumption. Therefore, \(\alpha < 1\) is a sufficient condition for the Pareto distribution to satisfy (9).

Note that in the case of partial bailouts, the equation \(T'(S, q_1) = -\sum_{i \in S} b_i\) does not necessarily hold. If a failing bank \(j\) is not bailed out and has sovereign debt \(b_j > 0\), then any change in \(q_1\), call it \(dq_1\), will not only increase the necessary bailout amount for the banks in \(S\) by \(\sum_{i \in S} b_i dq_1\), but it will also increase the shortfall of bank \(j\). If banks in \(S\) are exposed to bank \(j\), then the increased shortfall of \(j\), amplified by \((1 + \beta)^{\pi_{ij}}\), will be passed on to the banks \(i \in S\), so we generally have \(T'(S, q_1) \leq -\sum_{i \in S} b_i\). By restricting the overall amount of sovereign debt that banks hold (relative to the total outstanding amount \(B_0\)), we can ensure that \(B_0 + T'(S, q_1)\) remains positive even with partial bailouts. The higher \(\beta\), the less sovereign debt banks are allowed to hold.
B Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1

Note that the equilibrium sovereign debt price \( q_1 \) and the level of aggregate bailouts \( T(S, q_1) \) are simultaneously determined by (3) and (1) with \( T(S, q_1) = \sum t^i(S, q_1) \). Hence, combining these equations yields

\[
Rq_1 = 1 - F\left(B_0 + \frac{x - zq_1}{q_1}\right)
\]  

as the defining equilibrium condition, where \( z \equiv \sum b^i \) and \( x \equiv \sum L^i + d^i - c^i - (\pi L)^i \) and both sums are over the set of banks that require positive bailouts according to (1). Using the Pareto distribution for \( F(\cdot) \), the equation becomes

\[
Rq_1 = \left(\frac{B_0}{B_0 - z + \frac{x}{q_1}}\right)^\alpha
\]  

In the following, we will show that the equilibrium price \( q_1 \) must be decreasing in \( x \), the "autonomous" component of aggregate bailouts.

From our assumptions about \( F(\cdot) \) (in particular the Pareto assumption with \( \alpha < 1 \)) we know that for any \( x \geq 0 \) there is a unique \( q_1 \in (0, R^{-1}) \) solving the above equation. Note also that the monotonicity of \( x \mapsto q_1 \) is the same as that of \( q_1 \mapsto x \). But the latter mapping can be solved explicitly: From (11)

\[
x = \frac{B_0}{R^\frac{1}{\alpha}} q_1^{1-\frac{1}{\alpha}} - (B_0 - z) q_1
\]

The mapping \( q_1 \mapsto x \) is continuous and decreasing in the interval \((0, R^{-1})\). The continuity follows immediately from the fact that the functions \( q_1^{1-\frac{1}{\alpha}} \) and \( q_1 \) are continuous. The fact that it is decreasing follows from the fact that \( q_1^{1-\frac{1}{\alpha}} \) is decreasing in \( q_1 \) because \( \alpha < 1 \), and the function \(- (B_0 - z) q_1\) is decreasing in \( q_1 \) because \( B_0 > z \) by definition. Hence, \( x \mapsto q_1 \) is strictly decreasing and continuous as well. This concludes the proof.

We can even go one step further and derive an explicit expression for the derivative of the sovereign debt price with respect to the "autonomous" component of aggregate bailouts. This can be achieved by implicitly differentiating the pricing equation (10), treating \( q_1 \) as a function of \( x \). Differentiating on both sides yields

\[
R \frac{\partial q_1(x)}{\partial x} = -f \left( B_0 - z + \frac{x}{q_1} \right) \times \frac{q_1 - \frac{x}{q_1} \frac{\partial q_1(x)}{\partial x}}{q_1^2}
\]
and, solving for the term of interest,
\[
\frac{\partial q_1(x)}{\partial x} = \frac{-f \left( B_0 - z + \frac{x}{q_1} \right) \frac{1}{q_1}}{R - f \left( B_0 - z + \frac{x}{q_1} \right) \frac{x}{q_1}^\alpha}
\]
Finally, using the Pareto functional form \( f(\tau) = \frac{\alpha B_0^\alpha}{\tau^{\alpha+1}} \), we get
\[
\frac{\partial q_1(x)}{\partial x} = \frac{\alpha B_0^\alpha}{x} \frac{1}{\left( B_0 - z + \frac{x}{q_1} \right)^{\alpha+1} q_1} < 0,
\]
where the inequality holds because we have shown above that \( q_1 \) is decreasing in \( x \). ■

**Proof of Proposition 1**

The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that \( \hat{\omega}^B < \bar{\omega}^B \). Since the parameters \((\alpha, \gamma, B_0)\) are the same for both financial systems, from (4) and Lemma 1 this is true if and only if
\[
\hat{T}(S, \hat{q}_1^B) < \bar{T}(S, \bar{q}_1^B) \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{q}_1^B > \bar{q}_1^B.
\]
Hence, we must have
\[
1 - F \left( \frac{B_0 + \hat{T}(S, q)}{R} \right) > 1 - F \left( \frac{B_0 + \bar{T}(S, q)}{R} \right) \quad \forall q \in (0, R^{-1})
\]
which is true iff
\[
\hat{T}(S, q) = \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{\ell}(S, q) < \sum_{i=1}^n \bar{\ell}(S, q) = \bar{T}(S, q) \quad \forall q \in (0, R^{-1}).
\]
Since \( \hat{\ell}(S, q) = \bar{\ell}(S, q) \forall q \), \( \hat{b}^i = \bar{b}^i \), we must have that
\[
\exists i : \left( \hat{b}^i > \bar{b}^i \right) \land \left( \hat{T}(S, q) < \bar{T}(S, q) \forall q \in (0, R^{-1}) \right).
\]
Using the bailout definition in equation (1) and the second part of the proposition, the second part of (12) reads

\[
\left( L^i + d^i - \bar{c}^i + \frac{\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i}{R} - q \hat{b}^i - (\pi L)^i \right)^+ < \left( L^i + d^i - \bar{c}^i - q \bar{b}^i - (\pi L)^i \right)^+ \forall q \in (0, R^{-1}).
\]

Both quantities are bounded from below by zero, so the strict inequality requires that the right-hand side is positive and we can drop the (·)^+ operator. The statement thus simplifies to

\[
\frac{\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i}{R} < q(\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i) \quad \forall q \in (0, R^{-1}).
\]

Finally, since \((\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i) > 0\) from (12), we get

\[
q > R^{-1} \quad \forall q \in (0, R^{-1}),
\]

a contradiction. We have thus shown that \(\hat{\omega} B \geq \bar{\omega} B\). From (4) it is easy to see that \(\hat{w}^{NB} = \bar{w}^{NB}\) because with \(q_1^{NB} = R^{-1}\),

\[
\chi^i_1 = \left( L^i + d^i - \bar{c}^i + \frac{\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i}{R} - \frac{\hat{b}^i}{R} - (\pi \hat{p})^i \right)^+ = \chi^i_1 \quad \forall i \in N.
\]

Following Definition 2, \(\hat{\omega} B \geq \bar{\omega} B\) and \(\hat{w}^{NB} = \bar{w}^{NB}\) complete the proof of \(\hat{\Psi} \subseteq \Psi\). ■

**Proof of Proposition 2**

The proof proceeds in four steps: First, we argue that there exists a tighter upper bound on the equilibrium sovereign debt price than \(R^{-1}\) and that for the financial system \((L, \pi, \bar{c}, d, \bar{b})\) this bound is given by \(q_1^{\text{max}}\) used in the proposition. Second, we demonstrate that banks in \((L, \pi, \hat{c}, d, \bar{b})\) which have a positive shortfall at \(q_1^{\text{max}}\) need a bailout at the equilibrium \(\bar{q}_1\). Third, we show that at the equilibrium \(\bar{q}_1\) the net effect of moving from \((L, \pi, \hat{c}, d, \bar{b})\) to \((L, \pi, \hat{c}, d, \hat{b})\) on aggregate bailout expenditures is negative. Finally we prove that this implies \(\hat{T}(S, \bar{q}_1) < \hat{T}(S, \hat{q}_1)\) and thus \(\hat{q}_1 > \bar{q}_1\) which directly yields \(\hat{\omega} B < \bar{\omega} B\).

First note that because of the inverse relationship of the equilibrium price \(q_1^B\) and equilibrium aggregate bailouts \(T(S, q_1)\) in Lemma 1, the upper bound on the equilibrium price \(q_1^{\text{max}}\) is associated with the lower bound on aggregate bailouts. Moreover, the assumption
that $\mathcal{F}$ is non-empty and Assumption 1 guarantee that $q_1 < R^{-1}$. In general, equation (1) thus implies that for all $i \in N$

$$t^i(S, q_1) = \left(L^i + d^i - c^i - q_1 b^i - (\pi L)^i\right)^+ \geq \left(L^i + d^i - c^i - b^i R^{-1} - (\pi L)^i\right)^+ = \chi^i_0, \quad (13)$$

so the natural candidate for a lower bound on aggregate bailouts is $\sum_{i=1}^n \chi^i_0$. Note that by definition the right-hand side is positive if and only if $i \in \mathcal{F}$. Therefore, (13) holds with equality for every $i \in N$ if and only if two conditions hold:

1. $b^i = 0 \forall i \in \mathcal{F}$
2. $L^i + d^i - c^i - q_1^{\text{max}} b^i - (\pi L)^i \leq 0 \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{B}$

The first condition ensures that the equality holds for all $i$ for which the two sides of (13) are positive. The second part (already using the implicitly characterized $q_1^{\text{max}}$) ensures that it holds for all banks with $b^i > 0$ for which the right-hand side is zero.

We have thus established the existence of an exogenous minimum level of aggregate equilibrium bailouts, namely $\sum_{i=1}^n \chi^i_0$. From the pricing equation (3) it is now straightforward to characterize the corresponding maximum sovereign debt price in $(L, \pi, \bar{\varepsilon}, d, \bar{b})$ as the fixed-point solution to

$$q_1^{\text{max}} = \frac{1 - F\left(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \chi^i_0}{q_1^{\text{max}}}ight)}{R},$$

as in the proposition. Note that even though $q_1^{\text{max}}$ cannot be stated explicitly, it only depends on exogenous variables.

Next, let us denote the set of banks from part 1. of the proposition by $Y \equiv \{i : V^i_0 / \bar{b}^i < R^{-1} - \tilde{q}_1^{\text{max}}\}$. Their defining property says that for all $i \in Y$

$$\left(c^i + \bar{b}^i R^{-1} + (\pi L)^i - L^i - d^i\right)^+ < \bar{b}^i R^{-1} - \bar{b}^i \tilde{q}_1^{\text{max}}$$

which, after rearranging and combining with (1), implies that

$$\tilde{t}(S, \bar{q}_1^{\text{max}}) = \left(L^i + d^i - c^i - \bar{q}_1^{\text{max}} b^i - (\pi L)^i\right)^+ > 0 \quad \forall i \in Y.$$ 

As we have shown, $\bar{q}_1^{\text{max}}$ is the maximum possible equilibrium price, so in equilibrium it must be also true that $\tilde{t}(S, \bar{q}_1) > 0 \forall i \in Y$.

Next we will show that $\tilde{T}(S, \bar{q}_1) < \tilde{T}(S, \bar{q}_1)$ which is equivalent to $\sum_{i \in N} \tilde{t}(S, \bar{q}_1) - \tilde{t}(S, \bar{q}_1) < 0$. First note from the definition of bailout transfers (1) that $\tilde{t}(S, \bar{q}_1) = \tilde{t}(S, \bar{q}_1) \forall i \in$
\[ X \equiv \{ i : \hat{b}^i = \bar{b}^i \}. \] In contrast, for banks with \( \hat{b}^i < \bar{b}^i \) (namely \( i \in Y \) according to the proposition), we claim that

\[
\hat{t}(S, \bar{q}_1) = L^i + d^i - (\pi L)^i - \bar{q}_1 \hat{b}^i - \bar{c}^i - \frac{\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i}{R} < L^i + d^i - (\pi L)^i - \bar{c}^i - \bar{q}_1 \hat{b}^i = \bar{t}(S, \bar{q}_1),
\]

where we can drop the \((\cdot)^+\) operators because we have shown above that the right-hand side is positive. Equivalently, the claim can be written as

\[
\hat{t}(S, \bar{q}_1) - \bar{t}(S, \bar{q}_1) = (\bar{q}_1 - R^{-1})(\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i) < 0
\]

which is true because \((\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i) > 0 \forall i \in Y \) and \( \bar{q}_1 < R^{-1} \). Finally, there are banks \( i \in Z \equiv \{ i : \hat{b}^i > \bar{b}^i \} \) for which \( \hat{c}^i = \bar{c}^i - \frac{\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i}{R} \) because initial shortfalls \(\chi_0\) are identical in both systems. For these \( i \in Z \) we have

\[
\hat{t}(S, \bar{q}_1) = \left( L^i + d^i - (\pi L)^i - \bar{q}_1 \hat{b}^i - \bar{c}^i + \frac{\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i}{R} \right)^+ \geq \left( L^i + d^i - (\pi L)^i - \bar{c}^i - \bar{q}_1 \hat{b}^i \right)^+ = \bar{t}(S, \bar{q}_1)
\]

since the argument of the \((\cdot)^+\) operator on the left-hand side is strictly larger than that of the right-hand side. There are up to three disjoint subsets of banks to be distinguished: First, for banks where both sides of (14) are zero (call the set \( Z_1 \)), \( \hat{t}(S, \bar{q}_1) - \bar{t}(S, \bar{q}_1) = 0 \) is obvious. Second, for banks where the right-hand side is zero and the left-hand side positive \((Z_2)\), we have

\[
\hat{t}(S, \bar{q}_1) - \bar{t}(S, \bar{q}_1) = L^i + d^i - (\pi L)^i - \bar{q}_1 \hat{b}^i - \bar{c}^i + \frac{\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i}{R} > 0.
\]

And third, for banks where both sides are positive \((Z_3)\), we have

\[
\hat{t}(S, \bar{q}_1) - \bar{t}(S, \bar{q}_1) = (R^{-1} - \bar{q}_1)(\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i) > 0,
\]
where the inequality follows because both terms are positive for \( i \in Z_3 \). Now let \( \Delta^i \equiv \hat{\bar{p}}(\tilde{q}_1) - \bar{p}(\tilde{q}_1) \) and sum up over all banks:

\[
\sum_{i \in N} \Delta^i = \sum_{i \in X} \Delta^i + \sum_{i \in Y} \Delta^i + \sum_{i \in Z_1} \Delta^i + \sum_{i \in Z_2} \Delta^i + \sum_{i \in Z_3} \Delta^i
\]

\[
= \sum_{i \in Y} \Delta^i + \sum_{i \in Z_2} \Delta^i + \sum_{i \in Z_3} \Delta^i
\]

\[
= (R^{-1} - \tilde{q}_1) \sum_{i \in Y} (\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i) + \sum_{i \in Z_2} \Delta^i + (R^{-1} - \tilde{q}_1) \sum_{i \in Z_3} (\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i)
\]

\[
= (R^{-1} - \tilde{q}_1) \left\{ \sum_{i \in Y} (\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i) + \sum_{i \in Z_3} (\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i) \right\} + \sum_{i \in Z_2} L^i + d^i - (\pi L)^i - \tilde{q}_1 \hat{b}^i - \tilde{c}^i + \frac{\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i}{R}
\]

\[
= (R^{-1} - \tilde{q}_1) \left\{ \sum_{i \in Y} (\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i) + \sum_{i \in Z_3} (\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i) + \sum_{i \in Z_2} \bar{b}^i \right\} + \sum_{i \in Z_2} L^i + d^i - (\pi L)^i - \tilde{c}^i + \bar{b}^i R^{-1},
\]

where we have substituted the expressions for \( \Delta^i \) derived above for all subsets \( X, Y, Z \). By adding and subtracting \( (R^{-1} - \tilde{q}_1) \sum_{i \in Z_2} \bar{b}^i \), this can be rewritten as

\[
\sum_{i \in N} \Delta^i = (R^{-1} - \tilde{q}_1) \left\{ \frac{< 0}{\sum_{i \in Y} (\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i) + \sum_{i \in Z_2} \bar{b}^i} + \frac{\geq 0}{\sum_{i \in Z_2} L^i + d^i - (\pi L)^i - \tilde{c}^i - \tilde{q}_1 \hat{b}^i} + \frac{\geq 0}{\sum_{i \in Z_3} (\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i)} \right\} \tag{15}
\]

Notice that part 2. of the proposition says that \( \sum_{i \in N} (\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i) = 0 \) which is equivalent to \( \sum_{i \in Y \cup Z} (\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i) = 0 \). Hence, if the set \( Z_1 \) was empty and therefore \( N = X \cup Y \cup Z_2 \cup Z_3 \), the term in curly brackets would be zero and

\[
\sum_{i \in N} \Delta^i = \sum_{i \in Z_2} L^i + d^i - (\pi L)^i - \tilde{c}^i - \tilde{q}_1 \hat{b}^i \leq 0,
\]

where the inequality follows from the definition of the set \( Z_2 \) and is strict except for the knife-edge case in which every \( Z_2 \)-bank was just solvent in the tilde-equilibrium (i.e., assets exactly matched liabilities). If, in addition to \( Z_1 \), the set \( Z_2 \) was also empty, the last term in (15) would disappear and we would have \( \sum_{i \in N} \Delta^i = 0 \), so there would be no change in bailouts \((\hat{\bar{T}}(S, \tilde{q}_1) = \hat{\bar{T}}(S, \tilde{q}_1))\) and the two equilibria would coincide, i.e., \( \hat{T}(S, \tilde{q}_1) = \hat{T}(S, \tilde{q}_1) \) and \( \tilde{q}_1 = \tilde{q}_1 \). However, as soon as there is at least one \( Z_1 \)-bank (or a \( Z_2 \)-bank with positive equity in \( (L, \pi, \tilde{c}, d, \bar{b}) \)), equation (15) yields \( \hat{T}(S, \tilde{q}_1) < \hat{T}(S, \tilde{q}_1) \), as desired.

\[\text{Recall that the premise of the proposition is that sovereign debt is redistributed from banks in Y to banks in Z, so that } \sum_{i \in Y} (\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i) = - \sum_{i \in Z} (\hat{b}^i - \bar{b}^i).\]
Finally, using the right-hand side of the pricing equation (3), notice that the previous result implies

\[
\frac{1 - F(B_0 + \frac{T(q_1)}{q_1})}{R} > \frac{1 - F(B_0 + \frac{T(S,q_1)}{q_1})}{R} = \tilde{\gamma}_1
\]

As we show in Appendix A.1, under the Pareto assumption this expression increases monotonically in \(q_1\) and is strictly concave everywhere, including at \(\tilde{\gamma}_1\). Therefore, if \(\tilde{\gamma}_1\) is the equilibrium price in \((L, \pi, c, d, \hat{b})\), the unique fixed point \(\hat{q}_1\) in \((L, \pi, c, d, \hat{b})\) must be larger \((\hat{q}_1 > \tilde{\gamma}_1)\). As a consequence, since we have established above that \(\tilde{T}(S, \tilde{\gamma}_1) < \tilde{T}(S, \hat{q}_1)\) is true, \textit{a fortiori} \(\tilde{T}(S, \hat{q}_1) < \tilde{T}(S, q_1)\) also holds because \(\tilde{T}(\cdot)\) is a decreasing function.

It now follows directly from (4) that \(\hat{\omega}^B < \hat{\omega}^B\). Moreover, as in Proposition 1 we have \(\hat{\omega}^{NB} = \tilde{\omega}^{NB}\) because with \(q_1^{NB} = R^{-1}\),

\[
\hat{x}_1^i = \left(L^i + d^i - c^i + \hat{b}^i - \hat{b}^i + \frac{\hat{b}^i}{R} - (\alpha \hat{b})^i\right) = \tilde{x}_1^i \quad \forall i \in N
\]

Following Definition 2, \(\hat{\omega}^B < \hat{\omega}^B\) and \(\hat{\omega}^{NB} = \tilde{\omega}^{NB}\) complete the proof of \(\hat{\Psi} \supset \tilde{\Psi}\). □

**Proof of the Doom Loop Multiplier Property**

We want to show that \textit{ceteris paribus}, a higher portfolio share of sovereign debt \(b^i\) lowers the equilibrium price \(q_1\) and increases the bailout expenditure necessary to prevent bank \(i\) from defaulting. In other words, we want to show that \(\frac{\partial q_1}{\partial b^i} < 0\) and thus \(\frac{\partial t^i(S,q_1)}{\partial b^i} > 0\), where \(t^i(S,q_1)\) is a shorthand notation for the function defined in equation (1). Moreover, we want to alter \(b^i\) without changing the bank’s initial shortfall \(\chi_0^i\). Hence, we set \(c^i = k - b^i / R\), i.e., the sum of sovereign bond value, \(q_0b^i = b^i / R\), and cash asset amount stays constant at \(k\).

Using the Pareto functional form from Assumption 1 in the pricing equation (3), we obtain

\[
q_1 = \frac{B_0^a}{R \left(B_0 + \frac{T(S,q_1)}{q_1}\right)^{\alpha'}}
\]

which can be rewritten as

\[
\frac{B_0}{R^{1/\alpha}} q_1^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} = B_0 + \frac{T(S,q_1)}{q_1}
\]

(16)

Next, we differentiate both sides of the equation with respect to \(b^i\) and rearrange terms:

\[
\frac{B_0}{R^{1/\alpha}} \left(-\frac{1}{\alpha}\right) q_1^{-\frac{1}{\alpha} - 1} q_1' = \frac{T'(S,q_1)}{q_1} - \frac{T(S,q_1) q_1'}{q_1^2} = \frac{T'(S,q_1) q_1'}{q_1^2}
\]

\[
q_1' \left[ \frac{B_0}{R^{1/\alpha}} \left(-\frac{1}{\alpha}\right) q_1^{-\frac{1}{\alpha} - 1} + \frac{T(S,q_1)}{q_1^2} \right] = \frac{T'(S,q_1)}{q_1'},
\]

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where \( q'_1 \) denotes the partial derivative of \( q_1 \) with respect to \( b^i \) (analogous to the notation used for \( T' \)). After multiplying by \( q_1^2 \), we can rewrite this derivative as

\[
q'_1 = \frac{q_1 T'(S, q_1)}{T(S, q_1) - \frac{B_0}{a R^\frac{1}{a}} (q_1)^{1 - \frac{1}{a}}}.
\]

It can easily be shown that the right-hand side of the above expression is negative. We first analyze the denominator, and show that

\[
T(S, q_1) - \frac{B_0}{a R^\frac{1}{a}} (q_1)^{1 - \frac{1}{a}} < 0.
\]

Dividing by \( q_1 \), multiplying by \( a \), and rearranging we get

\[
a \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1} < \frac{B_0}{R^\frac{1}{a} q_1^{\frac{1}{a}}} = B_0 + \frac{T(S, q_1)}{q_1},
\]

where the last equality follows from (16). Because \( \alpha < 1 \) and \( B_0, T, q_1 > 0 \), it follows that the denominator is negative.

We next analyze the numerator, and examine \( T'(S, q_1) = \sum_{i \in S} t'_i (S, q_1) \) more closely. From (1), we can see that \( t'_i (S, q_1) \geq 1/R - q_1 > 0 \) because of the assumption on \( c^i = k - b^i / R \), and the fact that \( q_1 < 1/R \) by Assumption 1. Hence, the numerator is positive. As the numerator is negative and the denominator positive, we have shown that \( q'_1 := \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial b^i} < 0 \).

**Proof of Proposition 3**

The proof proceeds in three steps. In the first step we show that \( \hat{\Delta}'w > \hat{\Delta}w \); in the second that \( \hat{\Delta}'w > \hat{\Delta}w \); and in the last step that \( \hat{\Delta}'w - \hat{\Delta}w > \hat{\Delta}'w - \hat{\Delta}w \).

Using the full expression for the net welfare effect from Lemma 2, we want to show that

\[
\beta \sum_{k \in \mathcal{I}} \chi^k_1 \times C^k - \gamma \hat{\Delta}'(B_1 P(\text{Default})) > \beta \sum_{l \in \mathcal{J}} \chi^l_1 \times C^l - \gamma \hat{\Delta}'(B_1 P(\text{Default})).
\]

Note that by assumption \( \chi^i_1 = \chi^j_1 \) and hence \( \hat{\Delta}'(B_1 P(\text{Default})) = \hat{\Delta}'(B_1 P(\text{Default})) \), so the expression becomes

\[
\beta \sum_{k \in \mathcal{I}} \chi^k_1 \times C^k > \beta \sum_{l \in \mathcal{J}} \chi^l_1 \times C^l.
\]

Since \( \mathcal{I} \setminus i = \mathcal{J} \setminus j \) by assumption, this simplifies to

\[
\beta \chi^i_1 C^i > \beta \chi^j_1 C^j.
\]
which is true because $C_i > C_j$.

We now turn to the second step. Using Lemma 2 and the same facts as above (i.e. identical gamma-components and $\mathcal{I} \setminus i = \mathcal{J} \setminus j$) the expression we want to prove becomes

$$\beta \chi_1^i C_i + \beta \hat{\Delta}^i q_1 b' C_i > \beta \chi_1^j C_j + \beta \hat{\Delta}^j q_1 b' C_j$$

Identical shortfalls $\chi_1^i = \chi_1^j$ together with identical sovereign exposure $\hat{b}^i = \hat{b}^j = b' > 0$ imply an identical price impact $\hat{\Delta}^i q_1 = \hat{\Delta}^j q_1$, so we have

$$\chi_1^i (C_i - C_j) > \hat{\Delta}^i q_1 b' (C_i - C_j)$$

The left-hand side is clearly positive because $C_i > C_j$ whereas the right-hand side is negative because $\hat{\Delta}^i q_1 < 0$, so we have the desired result.

Finally, it remains to be shown that $\hat{\Delta}^i w - \hat{\Delta}^j w > \tilde{\Delta}^i w - \tilde{\Delta}^j w$. Again, using Lemma 2, identical gamma-components, and $\mathcal{I} \setminus i = \mathcal{J} \setminus j$ the expression becomes

$$\beta \chi_1^i (C_i - C_j) - \beta \hat{\Delta}^i q_1 b' (C_i - C_j) > \beta \chi_1^j (C_i - C_j).$$

That simplifies to

$$\beta \hat{\Delta}^i q_1 b' (C_i - C_j) < 0$$

which is true because $\hat{\Delta}^i q_1 < 0$. That concludes the proof. ■

**Proof of Proposition 4**

To prove the proposition it is sufficient to show that $\Delta^i w - \Delta^j w$ is monotonically increasing in $C$ and that $\exists \bar{C}$ such that $\Delta^i w = \Delta^j w$.

From Lemma 2 we can write $\Delta^i w - \Delta^j w$ as

$$\beta \left( \sum_{h \in \mathcal{I}} \chi_h^i C^h - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}} \chi_k^j C^k \right) + \beta \left( \sum_{h \in \mathcal{S} \setminus \mathcal{I}} \Delta^i q_1 b_h^i C^h - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{S} \setminus \mathcal{J}} \Delta^j q_1 b_k^j C^k \right) - \gamma \Gamma,$$

where $\Gamma = \Delta^i (B_1 P(\text{Default})) - \Delta^j (B_1 P(\text{Default})) > 0$ because $b^i > b^j$ implies that $t^i > t^j$ due to doom loop multiplier and $\mathcal{I}$ and $\mathcal{J}$ denote the sets of banks that become solvent through a bailout of bank $i$ and $j$, respectively. Now note that because $\mathcal{I} \setminus i = \mathcal{J} \setminus j$, $\chi_1^i = \chi_1^j = \chi_1$ and $C^i = C^j = C$, the benefit components of $\Delta^i w$ and $\Delta^j w$ are identical, so the first term collapses to zero.
Moreover, the $\gamma$-components of bailing out banks $j \neq i$ is the same in both tilde- and hat-components of bailing out banks $j$ excluding $i$ and $j$ themselves. Therefore, the previous expression can be rewritten as

$$\beta \left( \Delta i q_1 b^i C - \Delta i q_1 b^i C + (\Delta i q_1 - \Delta i q_1) \sum_{l \in S^c \setminus (\mathcal{I} \cup \mathcal{J})} b^l C^l \right) - \gamma \Gamma,$$

where the set $S^c \setminus (\mathcal{I} \cup \mathcal{J})$ consists of the banks (different from $i$ and $j$) that still default after saving either $i$ or $j$. We can now isolate the term multiplying $C$, namely $\beta(\Delta i q_1 b^i - \Delta i q_1 b^i)$. The premise of the proposition that $\frac{b^i}{\beta} > \frac{\Delta i q_1}{\Delta i q_1} > 1$ ensures that this coefficient is positive, so we have established that $\Delta i w - \Delta i w$ is monotonically increasing in $C$.

The existence of $\hat{C}$ such that $\Delta i w = \Delta i w$ can easily be shown by setting the previous expression equal to zero. We get

$$\beta \hat{C}(\Delta i q_1 b^i - \Delta i q_1 b^i) = \gamma \Gamma - \beta(\Delta i q_1 - \Delta i q_1) \sum_{l \in S^c \setminus (\mathcal{I} \cup \mathcal{J})} b^l C^l$$

and finally solve for the threshold level of centrality

$$\hat{C} = (\Delta i q_1 b^i - \Delta i q_1 b^i) > 0$$

That concludes the proof.  

**Proof of Proposition 5**

To prove the proposition it is sufficient to show that $(\hat{\Delta} i w - \hat{\Delta} i w) - (\tilde{\Delta} i w - \bar{\Delta} i w)$ is monotonically increasing in $C^i$ and that there exists a $C^*$ such that $\hat{\Delta} i w - \hat{\Delta} i w = \tilde{\Delta} i w - \bar{\Delta} i w$.

From Lemma 2 we can rewrite the difference as

$$\beta \left[ \sum_{k \in \mathcal{I}} \lambda^k_c k^k - \sum_{l \in \mathcal{J}} \lambda^l_c l^l \right] + \beta \left[ \sum_{k \in S^c \setminus \mathcal{I}} \hat{\Delta} i q_1 b^k C^k - \sum_{l \in S^c \setminus \mathcal{J}} \hat{\Delta} i q_1 b^l C^l \right]$$

$$-\gamma \left[ \hat{\Delta} i (B_1 P(\text{Default})) - \bar{\Delta} i (B_1 P(\text{Default})) \right]$$

$$- \beta \left[ \sum_{k \in \mathcal{I}} \lambda^k_c k^k - \sum_{l \in \mathcal{J}} \lambda^l_c l^l \right] - \beta \left[ \sum_{k \in S^c \setminus \mathcal{I}} \tilde{\Delta} i q_1 b^k C^k - \sum_{l \in S^c \setminus \mathcal{J}} \tilde{\Delta} i q_1 b^l C^l \right]$$

$$+ \gamma \left[ \tilde{\Delta} i (B_1 P(\text{Default})) - \bar{\Delta} i (B_1 P(\text{Default})) \right]$$

Now note that the benefit terms (the first and the fourth term) cancel each other out exactly. Moreover, the $\gamma$-components of bailing out banks $j \neq i$ is the same in both tilde- and hat-
system (because $\hat{b}^i = \tilde{b}^i$ and $\hat{\chi}^j_1 = \tilde{\chi}^j_1$), so $\hat{\Delta}^i(B_1P(\text{Default})) = \tilde{\Delta}^i(B_1P(\text{Default}))$ and the expression simplifies to

$$\beta \left[ \left( \sum_{k \in S^c \setminus I} \hat{\Delta}^i q_1 \hat{b}^k C^k - \sum_{k \in S^c \setminus I} \hat{\Delta}^i q_1 \tilde{b}^k C^k \right) - \left( \sum_{l \in S^c \setminus J} \hat{\Delta}^i q_1 \hat{b}^l C^l - \sum_{l \in S^c \setminus J} \hat{\Delta}^i q_1 \tilde{b}^l C^l \right) \right]$$

$$- \gamma \left( \hat{\Delta}^i(B_1P(\text{Default})) - \tilde{\Delta}^i(B_1P(\text{Default})) \right)$$

For the sake of notation, denote $\Gamma \equiv \hat{\Delta}^i(B_1P(\text{Default})) - \tilde{\Delta}^i(B_1P(\text{Default})) > 0$ because $\hat{b}^i > \tilde{b}^i$. We can then rewrite the previous expression as follows:

$$\beta \left[ \left( \sum_{k \in S^c \setminus I} (\hat{\Delta}^i q_1 \hat{b}^k - \hat{\Delta}^i q_1 \tilde{b}^k) \times C^k - \sum_{l \in S^c \setminus J} (\hat{\Delta}^i q_1 \hat{b}^l - \hat{\Delta}^i q_1 \tilde{b}^l) \times C^l \right) \right] - \gamma \Gamma$$

Now note that the proposition says that $\forall k \in S^c \setminus I$ we have $\hat{b}^k = \tilde{b}^k$ (first term in round brackets). Then we can simplify the expression to

$$\beta \left[ \left( \sum_{k \in S^c \setminus I} (\hat{\Delta}^i q_1 - \hat{\Delta}^i q_1) \hat{b}^k C^k - \sum_{l \in S^c \setminus J} \hat{\Delta}^i q_1 (\hat{b}^l - \tilde{b}^l) \times C^l \right) \right] - \gamma \Gamma$$

where we also use the fact that $\hat{\Delta}^i q_1 = \tilde{\Delta}^i q_1 \forall l \neq j$. Finally, since $\hat{b}^l = \tilde{b}^l \forall l \neq i$, the previous expression reduces to

$$\beta \left[ \left( (\hat{\Delta}^i q_1 - \hat{\Delta}^i q_1) \sum_{k \in S^c \setminus I} \hat{b}^k C^k \right) - \hat{\Delta}^i q_1 (\hat{b}^i - \tilde{b}^i) C^i \right] - \gamma \Gamma$$

Now it becomes clear that the expression is monotonically increasing in $C^i$, since $\hat{\Delta}^i q_1 < 0$ and $\hat{b}^i > \tilde{b}^i$. In a last step, we can solve for the threshold $C^*(j)$ that sets the above expression equal to zero and thereby prove its existence:

$$C^*(j) = \left( \left| \hat{\Delta}^i q_1 (\hat{b}^i - \tilde{b}^i) \right| ^{-1} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\beta} \Gamma - \frac{\gamma}{\beta} (\hat{\Delta}^i q_1 - \hat{\Delta}^i q_1) \sum_{k \in S^c \setminus I} \hat{b}^k C^k \right) \right) > 0$$

That concludes the proof. ■

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C Assumption on Spectral Radius

The spectral radius of the matrix \((1 + \beta)\Pi_D'\) is given by its largest eigenvalue (in absolute value). In the following, we compute the spectral radius first for \(|D| = 2\) and then for \(|D| = 3\) and derive conditions such that it is smaller than unity.

If the default set consists of two banks (and hence \(\Pi_D'\) is a 2 \(\times\) 2 matrix), to compute the eigenvalues \(\lambda_1, \lambda_2\) we solve the equation

\[
|(1 + \beta)\Pi_D' - \lambda I_2| = 0
\]

and obtain \(\lambda_{1/2} = \pm (1 + \beta) \sqrt{\pi_{12} \pi_{21}}.^{23}\) Hence, the spectral radius is less than unity if and only if

\[
\pi_{12} \pi_{21} < (1 + \beta)^{-2}
\]

If the default set consists of three banks (and hence \(\Pi_D'\) is a 3 \(\times\) 3 matrix) we proceed in the same way. We set the determinant of \((1 + \beta)\Pi_D' - \lambda I_3\) equal to zero and obtain the characteristic polynomial

\[
\lambda^3 - (1 + \beta)^2 \left( \pi_{13} \pi_{21} + \pi_{23} \pi_{31} + \pi_{12} \pi_{21} \right) \lambda - (1 + \beta)^3 \left( \pi_{13} \pi_{32} \pi_{21} + \pi_{12} \pi_{23} \pi_{31} \right) = 0
\]

which is a depressed cubic. Therefore, one of the solutions is guaranteed to be real, can be obtained by applying the Cardano formula and is given by

\[
\lambda_1 = \sqrt[3]{\frac{q}{2} + \sqrt{\frac{q^2}{4} - \frac{p^3}{27}}} + \sqrt[3]{\frac{q}{2} - \sqrt{\frac{q^2}{4} - \frac{p^3}{27}}}
\]

The remaining two roots \(\lambda_2, \lambda_3\) are

\[
\lambda_2 = \sqrt[3]{\frac{q}{2} + \sqrt{\frac{q^2}{4} - \frac{p^3}{27}}} \times \left( -\frac{1}{2} + \frac{i \sqrt{3}}{2} \right) + \sqrt[3]{\frac{q}{2} - \sqrt{\frac{q^2}{4} - \frac{p^3}{27}}} \times \left( -\frac{1}{2} - \frac{i \sqrt{3}}{2} \right)
\]

and

\[
\lambda_3 = \sqrt[3]{\frac{q}{2} + \sqrt{\frac{q^2}{4} - \frac{p^3}{27}}} \times \left( -\frac{1}{2} - \frac{i \sqrt{3}}{2} \right) + \sqrt[3]{\frac{q}{2} - \sqrt{\frac{q^2}{4} - \frac{p^3}{27}}} \times \left( -\frac{1}{2} + \frac{i \sqrt{3}}{2} \right)
\]

\(^{23}\)Recall that \(\pi_{ii} = 0 \ \forall i \in \mathbb{N}\) by construction of \(\Pi\). The submatrix \(\Pi_D\) inherits this property.
These expressions can be rewritten as

\[
\lambda_2 = \frac{1}{2} \lambda_1 + \frac{i \sqrt{3}}{2} \left( \sqrt[3]{\frac{q}{2}} + \sqrt[3]{\frac{q^2}{4} - \frac{p^3}{27}} - \sqrt[3]{\frac{q}{2}} - \sqrt[3]{\frac{q^2}{4} - \frac{p^3}{27}} \right) \equiv \lambda_2
\]

and

\[
\lambda_3 = \frac{1}{2} \lambda_1 + \frac{i \sqrt{3}}{2} \left( \sqrt[3]{\frac{q}{2}} - \sqrt[3]{\frac{q^2}{4} - \frac{p^3}{27}} - \sqrt[3]{\frac{q}{2}} + \sqrt[3]{\frac{q^2}{4} - \frac{p^3}{27}} \right) \equiv \lambda_3
\]

Here we can see that iff \(4p^3 < 27q^2\), the argument of the square roots is positive and hence \(\lambda_2, \lambda_3\) are complex numbers. To find out the largest eigenvalue, we thus have to compare \(|\lambda_1|\) to the modulus of the two complex roots. First note that \((\tilde{\lambda}_2)^2 = (\tilde{\lambda}_3)^2\) and hence

\[
|\lambda_2| = \sqrt{\frac{1}{4} (\lambda_1)^2 + \frac{3}{4} (\lambda_2)^2} = |\lambda_3|,
\]

so the two complex roots have the same absolute value. Now note that \(\lambda_1 > \tilde{\lambda}_2 > 0\) and hence also \((\lambda_1)^2 > (\tilde{\lambda}_2)^2\), so we can write

\[
|\lambda_2| = \sqrt{\frac{1}{4} (\lambda_1)^2 + \frac{3}{4} (\lambda_2)^2} < \sqrt{\frac{1}{4} (\lambda_1)^2 + \frac{3}{4} (\lambda_1)^2} = \sqrt{(\lambda_1)^2} = |\lambda_1|,
\]

so we have established that the real root \(|\lambda_1|\) is the spectral radius iff \(4p^3 < 27q^2\). In that case the condition we are looking for reads

\[
\sqrt[3]{\frac{q}{2}} + \sqrt[3]{\frac{q^2}{4} - \frac{p^3}{27}} + \sqrt[3]{\frac{q}{2}} - \sqrt[3]{\frac{q^2}{4} - \frac{p^3}{27}} < 1.
\]

If instead \(4p^3 > 27q^2\), the argument of the square roots is negative and it can be shown that all three roots \(\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3\) are real in this case.

In the knife-edge case of \(4p^3 = 27q^2\), the square roots are equal to zero and we have

\[
\lambda_1 = 2 \sqrt[3]{\frac{q}{2}},
\]

\[
\lambda_2 = \lambda_3 = -\frac{\lambda_1}{2},
\]

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\( |\lambda_1| \) is the largest eigenvalue and our condition \( |\lambda_1| < 1 \) becomes

\[
q = (1 + \beta)^3 \left( \pi^{13} \pi^{32} \pi^{21} + \pi^{12} \pi^{23} \pi^{31} \right) < \frac{1}{4}
\]

We conclude this section with two stylized examples. First suppose that the interbank network forms a ring of length \( n = 3 \) in which all three banks default, i.e., \( \pi^{ij} = 1 \) for \( j = i + 1 \), modulo \( n \), and \( \pi^{ij} = 0 \) otherwise. In that case note from (17) that \( p = 0 \) and \( q = (1 + \beta)^3 \), so we are in the first case with \( 4p^3 < 27q^2 \) and the spectral radius is given by the unique real root in (18). The condition for node depth to be well defined reads

\[
|\lambda_1| = |\sqrt[3]{q}| = 1 + \beta < 1
\]

which is a contradiction because \( \beta > 0 \) by assumption. Hence, if the network is a ring and all three banks default, node depth cannot be computed using the matrix inversion formula.

As a second example, suppose that the interbank network is complete, that is \( \pi^{ij} = \frac{1}{n-1} \forall i, j, \ i \neq j \). For ease of notation, let \( k = n - 1 \) so that from (17) we know that

\[
p = (1 + \beta)^2 \left( k^{-2} + k^{-2} + k^{-2} \right) = \frac{3(1 + \beta)^2}{k^2}
\]

\[
q = (1 + \beta)^3 \left( k^{-3} + k^{-3} \right) = \frac{2(1 + \beta)^3}{k^3}
\]

It is easy to verify that in this case we get exactly \( 4p^3 = 27q^2 \), so the condition for \( C \) to be well defined is given by \( q < \frac{1}{4} \) as shown above. Plugging in the expression for \( q \) yields

\[
k > 2(1 + \beta)
\]

Hence, node depth in a default set of three banks is well defined iff the total number of banks in the network \( n \) is larger than \( 1 + 2(1 + \beta) \). The critical number of banks is increasing in the bankruptcy cost parameter \( \beta \).

DAlgorithm to Find Equilibria with Optimal Bailouts

First note that any chosen subset of surviving banks \( S \) induces unique transfers \( (t^i(\bar{p}(S), q_1))_{i \in S} \) according to equation (1). To determine these transfers (and the associated sovereign debt prices) we proceed as follows for each possible subset \( S \subseteq N \):

1. Starting with an initial guess of \( q_1 = 1/R \), we find the Pareto dominant clearing payment vector \( \bar{p}(S) \) as per Definition 1, imposing that all surviving banks repay their liabilities in full, i.e. \( \bar{p}^i = L^i \ \forall i \in S \).
2. Knowing the clearing payment vector \( \bar{p}(S) \), we compute the required bailout transfers to \( S \)-banks from equation (1), as a function of the current guess for \( q_1 \).

3. Aggregate bailouts \( T(\bar{p}(S), q_1) = \sum_{i \in S} t^i(\bar{p}(S), q_1) \) pin down the sovereign debt price \( q_1 < 1/R \) via equation (3). We then repeat the procedure with the updated guess for \( q_1 \) and iterate until convergence.

4. Compute welfare losses \( w(S) \) using equation (4).

The optimal set \( S^* \) is the set with the lowest welfare losses.